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NOTES

MTV":
Censored
My
Want
"I
Malaysia's Censorship Regime Collides
with the Economic Realities of the
Twenty-First Century
ABSTRACT

Despite an extensive history of censorship and political
speech suppression,Malaysia's Vision 2020 goal of becoming
a fully developed nation requires the nation to facilitate an
open exchange of ideas and information. The government
seeks to create a centerfor broadcasting,filmmaking, and the
development of multimedia products. While Malaysia has
begun to abandon some of its censorship practices, the
remaining restrictions on its citizens' speech and press
freedoms threaten to hamstring the country's efforts to
become a fuly developed nation by 2020.
This Note discusses Malaysia's beginning as a British
colony, identifying the religious, racial, and class distinctions
now used to justify the nation's censorshippolicies and laws.
This Note then examines the current social and economic
pressuresforcing Malaysia to re-examine its economic focus
and its system of censorship. The Note will critically examine
Malaysia'splans to create the Multimedia Super Corridorand
to become a center for broadcasting and filmmaking, citing
the legal and policy changes adopted to facilitate these
projects. Finally, after concluding that Malaysia's proposed
modiflcations of its censorshippolicy will not allow the nation
to completely achieve its Vision 2020, this Note suggests
additional legal and policy alternatives. These proposals
would enable Malaysia to more easily achieve its goal of
developing the entertainmentand information industries as a
means of becoming a fully developed nation.

98

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 31:97

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION .....................................................
MALAYSIA'S HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP .......................
A.
The Roots of Censorship: Racial, Religious,
and Economic Division ................................
B.
Continuing Censorship: Malaysia's Speech
and PressRestrictions.................................
1.
Common Law Speech Restrictions ...
2.
National Security Regulations ..........
a.
Emergency Powers ...............
b.
The Internal Security Act .....
c.
The Sedition Act...................
d.
The Official Secrets Act ........
3.
Mass Media Regulations ..................
a.
Cinematograph Films
(Censorship) Act of 1952 ......
b.
The Printing Press and
Publications Act of 1984 .......
c.
The Broadcasting Act
of 1988 ................................
C.
Shifting the Balance: The Effect of
Speech Restrictions and Media Control
on Malaysia'sPoliticalInstitutions................
1.
The Constitutional Crisis of 1988:
Limiting the Judiciary's Independence
2.
The Monarchy and the Constitutional
Crisis of 1993 .................................
3.
Running the Show: The Power of
Parliament and the Prime Minister..

101
102
104
105
106
107
108
111
113
113
114
116
118

121
121
125
127

PRESSURES ON MALAYSIA'S SYSTEM OF CENSORSHIP ...

128

A.
B.
C.
D.

128
131
133

Economic Pressures....................................
PoliticalPressures.......................................
Human Rights Issues..................................
Emerging Technologies: An Outer
Barrieron Government Censorship...............
"I CAN SEE CLEARLY NOW": VISION 2020,

MALAYSIA'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURES OF ITS .......
REGULATORY SYSTEM .............................................

A.

136

137

The Multimedia Super Corridor:Asia's
Silicon Valley?............................................
Asia's Hollywood? ......................................

138
141

A CORRECTED VISION: PROPOSALS FOR ACHIEVING
MALAYSIA'S GOALS, WITHOUT CENSORSHIP ................

144

B.
V.

99

A.

Restore the ConstitutionalMandateof
a True Separationof Powers........................

145

CENSORSHIP RN MALAYSIA

19981

B.

C.
VI.

EliminatePoliticalControl of the Mass
Media..............................................................
1.
Develop an Industry-Designed
Ratings System ...............................
2.
End Political Control of the Mass Media
3.
End Government Control Over Foreign
New s ..............................................
Eliminate Internet Censorshipthroughout
Malaysia....................................................

CONCLUSION .........................................................

146
147
149
150
150
151

I. INTRODUCTION

Less than five years ago, Malaysia drew international
attention and criticism when it banned the movie Schindler's List,
deeming it "propaganda."'
In 1991, Malaysia banned all
privately-owned satellite dishes, 2 describing the regulations as a
matter of highest national unity and security: the preservation of
Malaysian morals and values.3 Agencies affiliated with Malaysia's
Information Ministry banned or censored every movie, television
broadcast, and magazine legally imported or distributed within
the nation. 4 Malaysia's prime minister regularly lambasted the
5
West for its declining morals and increasing violence.
Then, in 1996, Malaysia launched its first broadcast satellite,
Parliament approved an end to the ban on satellite dishes, and
newly formed broadcast services began vying for Malaysian
audiences. 6
Instead of condemning Western immorality and
human rights conceptions, Malaysia's prime minister gained
attention for his speeches to Silicon Valley executives, proclaiming

1.

Malaysia Bans Oscar-Wmning "Schindler'sList," Reuters World Serv.,

Mar. 23, 1994, availableinLEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
2.
Malaysia Bans Private Satellite Dishes for Television, REUTER LIBRARY
REP., Aug. 1, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
3.
Lai Kwok Kin, Satellite TV Presages Battle for Asian Skies, REUTER
LIBRARY REP., Feb. 27; 1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
4.
See infra Part II.B.3 (describing Malaysia's media regulations).
5.
See The Nations Speak; UN General Assembly General Debate,
September 27 to October 13, 1993, 31 U.N. CHRON. 1, 8 (1994); Hugo Gurdon,
Malaysian Leader Attacks 'Rich and Arrogant' West, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 28,

1992, availablein LEXIS, News Library, TELEGR File.
6.
See infraPart II.B.3.c.
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the gospel of an uncensored Internet, 7 and to Hollywood, praising
its filmmaking excellence. 8
This Note explores this dramatic change in Malaysian policy
and considers whether Malaysia's plan to become a fully

developed nation truly reflects a sea-change in public policy, or
merely a pragmatic, reluctant shifting tide.
Part II examines the scope and history of censorship in
Malaysia, beginning with its origins as a humble, struggling
nation surviving on its rubber exports. Existing constitutional
guarantees and restrictions on the freedoms of speech and press
are surveyed. This part then analyzes the effects censorship and
idea suppression have had on the country's political and legal
institutions,
particularly the judiciary.
This
analysis
demonstrates the systemic problems censorship within a
democracy creates.
Part III explores the political, international, and economic
pressures behind Malaysia's recent policy changes. Malaysia's
current economic concerns are the result of an amazing period of
national economic growth.
However, this growth has not
occurred within a vacuum. This part examines the increasing
economic competition forcing Malaysia to adopt a new strategy to
fulfill its goal of becoming a fully developed nation by the year
2020. Next, this part identifies external and internal political
issues that demand a less restrictive approach to the information
and entertainment markets. Finally, this part notes the rapid
emergence of new technologies eliminating the government's
ability to enforce its censorship policies.
Malaysia's responses to these pressures are discussed in Part
IV, which focuses on the ambitious plan to develop a "Multimedia
Super Corridor," a center for the world's finest high-tech
companies.
An analysis of recent changes in Malaysia's
telecommunications laws follows. In addition, this part addresses
Malaysia's goal of becoming the center of a thriving broadcasting
and filmmaking industry catering to audiences throughout
Southeast Asia and the world.
Finally, this part identifies
remaining legal and political barriers to the realization of these
plans.

7.

Prime Minister's Office, January 15, 1997 at the Silicon Valley

Conference for Investors on the MSC
(visited Oct.
29,
1997)
<http://www.smpke.jpm.my/gn-data/ucapan.pm/1997/970115.htm> (copy of

Dr. Mahathir's speech presented at Stanford University).

8.
Prime Minister's Office, January 14, 1997 at the Luncheon Attended by
Beverly Hills Entertainment and Community Leaders (visited Oct. 29, 1997)

<http://www.smpke.jpm.my/gn-data/ucapan.pm/1997/970114.htm>
Dr. Mahathir's speech presented in Beverly Hills, California).

(copy of
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Part V suggests ways for Malaysia to eliminate these barriers,
enabling the nation to achieve its goal of becoming fully
developed. First, this part argues that Malaysia must restore the
judicial independence that existed before 1988. Without this, the
rule of law in Malaysia will continue to be threatened, and the
courts will be unable to develop a culturally sensitive
interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of free expression.
Restoring independence will require changes to several statutes,

including the Internal Security Act. Second, this part urges the
government to completely relinquish control of the nation's mass
media through privatization and legal reform. Third, this part
suggests the creation of a consistent ratings system to guide
producers and performers. Without such a system, ambiguous
statutes and government overregulation will result in increasing
self-censorship, further curtailing free expression within
Malaysia's entertainment and information industries. Finally,
this part proposes that Malaysia extend the guarantees of an
uncensored Internet beyond the confines of the Multimedia Super
Corridor.
Part VI concludes that, without these changes, many of
Malaysia's economic objectives will be limited by a deep-rooted
system of censorship.

II. MALAYSIA'S HISTORY OF CENSORSHIP
Before the British arrival in the early 1800s, the region
occupied by Malaysia existed as a series of Islamic sultanates on
the island of Borneo and the Malay peninsula. 9 After accepting
English law and protection, the Malay states began to form a
0
A
federation, a process completed shortly after World War Two.'
multinational commission chaired by Britain's Lord Reid prepared
a constitution that became effective on August 31, 1957.11
Following the addition of Singapore, 12 Sabah, and Sarawak in

ROBERT L. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD 165 (1995).
9.
10.
Id. In 1948, the British government and the Malay rulers agreed to a
formal union, the Federation of Malaya. Id.
11.
Id. This day is now celebrated by Malaysians as "Merdeka Day." Id.
"Merdeka" means free or independent. H. P. LEE, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN
CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA 17 n. 1 (1995).
Singapore remained in the federation for only two years. See MADDEX,
12.
supra note 9, at 165. Although geography suggests that Singapore would have
belonged to the federation from the beginning, the tiny island remained a
separate colony because of the "fears of the Malays that they would be dominated
by the Malayan Chinese if Singapore's one million Chinese acceded to Malaya."
LEE, supra note 11, at 6. The prime minister of Singapore originally desired an
alliance with Malaysia because of the fear of communist influences. Id. at 8.
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1963, the federation revised its constitution, renaming itself
"Malaysia."1 3
The constitution established a parliamentary
system of government 14 based on the Westminster model and
retaining its monarchy.
A. The Roots of Censorship:
Racial,Religious, and Economic Division
Racial politics and the suppression of racial hostility continue
to be powerful forces behind much of Malaysia's legislation,
particularly legislation that results in the suppression of speech
and press freedoms. 1 5 At its inception, Malaysia's population
consisted of a diverse group of citizens. Approximately half of the
population comprised Malay and other aboriginal groups, while
thirty-seven percent was Chinese. 16 Indians numbered twelve
percent, and the remainder of the population consisted of
Pakistanis and Ceylonese. 17 Following Singapore's departure in
1965, the number of bumiputeras 8 in Malaysia increased as the
Chinese and Indian populations decreased. 19
Cultural differences among these ethnic groups profoundly
affected Malaysia's development.
The Malay population is
Muslim, speaks Bahasa Malasia, and has traditionally inhabited
the country's rural areas.2 0 Malays traditionally dominated the

A measure of disagreement remains concerning the progenitor of the split.
Compare id. at 10 (Escalating political events and heightened racial tensions
culminated in the expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia .... ."), with Rahmah
Hashim, Accommodating National Goals and Conflicting Societal Needs Through
Privatization of Television Broadcasting: The Malaysian Case 54 (1989)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on file with Ohio State

University Library) ("Singapore withdrew from the enlarged Federation in August
1965, because of conflicting socio-political interests.").
Tension on both sides of the Straits appears to be resurfacing as Malaysia
begins to compete economically with Singapore. S. Jayasankaran & Murray
Hiebert, Snipe, Snipe: Malaysia-SingaporeSpat Reflects Growing Economic Rivalry,
FAR E. EcON. REV., June 5, 1997, at 24.
13.
LEE, supra note 11, at 8-9.
14.
15.

MALAY. CONST.pt. IV, ch. 4.
See infra PartlI.

16.

HAROLD CROUCH, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN MALAYSIA 14 (1996).

17.
Id.
These populations are not evenly distributed throughout the
nation. In Sabah and Sarawak, the population of Malays and other indigenous
peoples is more concentrated. See Hashim, supranote 12, at 53-54.

18.

Literally, bumiputera means "sons of the soil." The term refers to all

indigenous peoples generally, though not exclusively, Malay. See CROUCH, supra
note 16, at 14; Hashim, supranote 12, at 53.

19.
The Chinese population decreased to 34.1%, while the Indian
population accounted for only 9% of the population. Hashim, supra note 12, at
53.
20.
Id. at 14-15.
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agricultural sector, as well as the nation's bureaucracy.2 1 The
Chinese and Indians controlled the business class, and, despite a

greater variety of dialects and religious beliefs, achieved greater

social and political mobilization than the Malays. 22 The Malays,
through the
however, soon gained control of Malaysian politics
3
2
United Malays National Organization (UMNO).
Achieving a federation of states required the support of non-

Malay communities and their respective political parties. UMNO
helped create an alliance leadership, aimed at forging a consensus
on common issues. 24 For twelve years this alliance satisfied its
But on May 13, 1969, racial tension
diverse constituency.
25
exploded into violence as Malays attacked Chinese and Indians.
26
When
The king announced an official state of emergency.
Parliament reconvened, it quickly amended the constitution,
seeking to correct racial and economic imbalances and to limit
freedom of speech, particularly in the discussion of sensitive
Despite these restrictions and
issues such as race.2 7
cultural
differences and preferential
racial
and
adjustments,
government
by
a
Malay-dominated
Malays
for
treatment
continued to be a source of conflict. 28 Yet, in nearly thirty years,
this conflict has yet to result in wide-scale violence.

21.
Id. at 15. The British considered the Malays the legitimate rulers of
the country and favored them in bureaucratic appointments. Id. at 17.
22.
Id. at 14-15.
23.
Malay dominance in politics was largely the result of British support.
The elite were English-educated Malays appointed to positions of leadership in
the military, police, and bureaucracy. Id. at 17. Political control naturally
followed this endowment.
Id. at 20.
24.
LEE, supra note 11, at 13. The general elections preceded the riots by
25.
three days. Id. There had been earlier riots in 1964 and in 1967; the first
occurred in Singapore when the island-city belonged to Malaysia. See CROUCH,

supra note 16, at 23. Most observers blamed the dramatic income and status
disparities in Malaysia's plural economy as the cause of lingering tension and
periodic violence. Id. at 20-23. See also William Case, Malaysia: Aspects and
Audiences of Legitimacy, in POLITICAL LEGITIMACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE QUEST FOR
MORAL AUTHORITY 69, 93 (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 1995) (exploring the events and
emotions preceding the May 13 riots). The efforts of the Malay government to
establish Bahasa Malasia as the national language certainly contributed as well.
LEE, supranote 11, at 23.
LEE, supranote 11, at 14.
26.
27.
Id.
28.
See Melanie Beth Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which are
More Fundamental?,40 EMORY L.J. 911, 921-22 (1991) (noting that the exclusive
use of Bahasa Malasia, the official Malay language, "is increasingly contested by
the other ethnic groups," and that the government's attempts to push for greater
adherence to Islam has "exacerbate[d] the struggle for political power").
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B. Continuing Censorship:
Malaysia'sSpeech and PressRestrictions

Malaysia's Federal Constitution (Constitution) grants its
citizens "freedom of speech and expression;" 29 however, it
simultaneously

allows

these

freedoms

to

be

restricted

by

Parliament when necessary to accomplish a broad range of
objectives, including national security, public order, and morality,
and to prevent "contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to
any offence."3 0 Shortly after its adoption, an annotated edition of
the Constitution remarked that it was "anybody's guess" what the
word "morality" meant.3 1 Now, forty years later, the definition is
perhaps more apparent only because Parliament has so often
used the word to justify its legislation.
Not only does the subjective wording of the available
limitations provide Parliament with a broad range of grounds for
restricting individual liberties, but the constitutional language
32
also seems to preclude judicial review of governmental actions.
Without judicial review, these constitutional guarantees appear
worthless.3 3 Yet, the judiciary has struck down some regulatory

29.
MALAY. CoNsT. art. 10, § (1)(a). Freedom of assembly, sans weapons, is
also allowed. Id. art. 10, § (1)(b).
30.
Id. art. 10, § (2)(a). Freedom of assembly and association are similarly
restricted. See id. art. 10, §§ (2)(b), (c) to (4).
31.
L. A. Sheridan, Federationof Malaya Constitution,Parts Two and Three,
1 U. MALAY. L. REV. 175, 182 (1959).
32.
Article 4, § (2)(b) of the Constitution states that "[t]he validity of any
law shall not be questioned on the ground that... it imposes such restrictions as

are mentioned in Article 10(2) but those restrictions were not deemed necessary
or expedient by Parliament for the purposes mentioned in that Article." MALAY.
CONST. art. 4, § (2)(b). Furthermore, a law can only be declared invalid as ultra
vires in a special proceeding that requires permission from the Supreme Court
and the inclusion of the government as a party if it so desires. MALAY. CONST. art.
4, § (3)-(4).
Courts, however, have occasionally resorted to natural justice principles to
rule against the government. See Gurdial Singh Nijar, The Right to Be Heard and
the Imposition of Restriction Orders Under the Internal Security Act, 2 JERNAL
UNDANG-UNDANG
91, 91 (1975) (examining whether the government's "vast
discretionary powers may be tempered with by [sic] one facet of natural justice,
the right to be heard.... ."). See also Sheridan, supra note 31, at 182 (arguing
that a law restricting a fundamental liberty could be challenged on the grounds
that it does not relate to one of the government's interests). On this reading, § (1)
may indeed pose some restrictions on the government.
33.
But see Sheridan, supranote 31, at 182 (arguing the Constitution does
pose limits on Parliament).
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decisions as contrary to the Constitution. 1
however, have made such decisions unlikely.3 5

Recent events,

1. Common Law Speech Restrictions

For the most part, Malaysia's common law speech restrictions
do not seem unusual to U.S. lawyers. The torts of defamation,
slander, and libel3 6 all exist in Malaysia. Less familiar, however,
is a variation of contempt of court labeled "scandalizing the
government." 37 This speech limitation serves the specific purpose
of restricting discussion of government institutions, 38 and may be
prosecuted by the Attorney General or a private citizen.3 9 In MBF
Holdings BHD v. Houng Hai Kong,4° the court dismissed the
defendants' arguments that only the Parliament has authority to
enforce a scandalization action under the Constitution, reasoning
common law before Merdeka Day
that powers granted by the
41
remain vested in the courts.
The elements of scandalizing are identified in Attorney
General v. Lingle & Ors. 4 2 In this case, the government brought

See J. P. Berthelsen v. Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia &
34.
Ors, [1987] 1 M.L.J. 134, availablein 1986 MW LEXTS 240 (Kuala Lumpur 1986)
and infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.

35.

See infra Part II.C.1. But see CROUCH, supra note 16, at 142 (Despite

the fears of many, the judicial crises of 1988 did not completely destroy the
independence of the judiciary.").
See generally SALLEH HAJI BUANG, LAW OF DEFAMATION IN MALAYSIA AND
36.
SINGAPORE (1992); KEITH R. EVANS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN SINGAPORE AND

MALAYSIA (1993) (each providing a thorough discussion of these torts).
Although most cases concern scandalizations of the judiciary, the law
37.
is not so limited. See Michael Hor & Collin Seah, Selected Issues in the Freedom
of Speech and Expression in Singapore, 12 SING. L. REv. 296, 311 (1991)
(describing the offense of "speech injurious to the reputation of public officials").
38.
Contempt of court is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, along
with defamation. MALAY. CONST. art. 10, § 2. The British believed these
restrictions were necessary to bolster the new institutions.
39.
For an example of a scandalizing case brought by a citizen, see
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 1 M.L.J. 50 (1988), in which the
court dismisses allegations that the prime minister had scandalized the judiciary
by his uncomplimentary comments. See also text accompanying note 173.
40.
[1993] 2 M.L.J. 516 (1993), availablein 1993 M.J LEXIS 188 (High Ct.
1993) (noting that Parliament has not used the constitutional authority available
in § 10(2) to pass a specific law on contempt of court).
Id. at *16.
41.
[1995] 1 S.L.R. 696 (1995), availablein 1995 SLR LEXIS 15 (Sing. High
42.
Ct. 1995). Although not a Malaysian case, the law of Singapore and Malaysia is
similar in this area. This case held that the criticisms scandalized the judiciary
by implying that the "judiciary of Singapore is a willing participant to a
scheme.., to suppress political dissent by awarding substantial damages in
unmeritorious civil suits initiated by government politicians against opposition
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an action against a university fellow who had written an article
characterizing the majority government as "relying upon a
compliant judiciary to bankrupt oppositioff politicians." 43
Although acknowledging the right to criticize the government, the
court explained that this freedom does not encompass writings or
acts "calculated to bring a court or a judge ..
into contempt or
to lower his authority," or to "obstruct or interfere with the due
course of justice." 44 Even if unintentional, a publication that
"impugns the integrity and impartiality of the court" is
punishable. 45 The policy of this ruling was the protection of the
members of the public "from the mischief they will incur if the
authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired." 4 6
2. National Security Regulations
Under the guise of national security, the government of
Malaysia has restricted political discourse on a variety of
important topics. In addition, the concept of national security
has been stretched to justify the government's ban on satellite
dishes, because of morality concerns. This example demonstrates
the extent to which the government can label any objective or

policy as a matter of national security, allowing the majority
government the potential to restrict completely the populace's
freedom of speech and expression.
Malaysia's national security regulations are many. Their
collective scope is both broad and indeterminate. These statutes
were crafted to give the executive sweeping powers in times of
crisis. The delegation of these powers by the constitutional
drafters and Parliament resulted in extremely ambiguous rules.
Furthermore, judicial review in some cases has been curtailed.
Without judicial review of the executive's actions, citizens cannot
identify the limits of the power held by the executive and
Parliament.
Thus, Malaysians are faced with vague statutes
imposing substantial penalties, enforced by an executive branch
that has demonstrated a tendency to overregulate. As a result,
Malaysians are likely to self-censor, avoiding even the possibility
of a prosecution for violating one of the statutes enacted to
preserve Malaysia's national security.

politicians." Id. at *17. The third-party publishers and printers of the offending
article also received fines. Id. at *45-46.
43.
Id. at*9.
44.
Id. at*11.
45.
Id. at *15.
46.
Id. at *43.
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a. Emergency Powers
The drafters of Malaysia's Constitution included provisions
authorizing the use of emergency powers 4 7 but recommended
their use only in a manner limited and defined, both in duration
and extent of derogation allowed.4 8
Because the use of
emergency powers and the rule of law inherently conflict, the
former can only be justified to the extent that it allows the latter
to prosper in the long-term. Therefore, an analysis of Malaysia's
emergency powers must focus on whether the government's use of
such powers has led to a resumption of the rule of law or to an
extended period of usurpation of power by the government. 4 9
This analysis can best be accomplished by measuring the
proportionality of the government's response to a national danger
or crisis.
Article 150 of the Constitution delegates to the king the
power to declare an emergency. 5 0 This provision has been
amended several times since 1957.51 Once an emergency has
been declared, the executive authority of the government is
unlimited.5 2 Parliament may "make laws with respect to any
matter, if it appears to Parliament that the law is required by

reason of the emergency."5 3 Furthermore, this provision purports
to insulate such laws from a judicial declaration of invalidity. S 4

47.
MALAY. CONST. pt. XI.
48.
M. Ariff Yusof, Emergency Powers and the Rule of Law, 10 JURNAL
UNDANG-UNDANG 87, 88 (1983) (quoting the Report of the Federation of Malaya
ConstitutionalCommission, 1957).
49.
Ic at 87.
50.
If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency exists

whereby the security, economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part
thereof is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of Emergency making therein
a declaration to that effect. MALAY. CONsT.art. 150, § (1).
The proclamation of an emergency may also take the form of a preemptive
strike. Id. art. 150, § (2). The king is allowed to create ordinances during an
emergency, but only when Parliament is not in session. Id. art. 150, §§ (2A)-(3).
51.
Yusof, supra note 48, at 89. The most recent amendment is the
Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1981 (Act A514). Id. This amendment was the
last in a series of amendments that have relaxed the controls on the use of
emergency powers. Id. at 92. See also id. at 92-94 (discussing in depth the
changes wrought by this amendment).
52.

MALAY. CONST. art. 150, §§ (4)-(5).

53.

Id. art. 150, § (5).

54.
Id. art. 150, § (6). Parliament is not free from judicial review, however,
if it creates a law concerned with "Islamic law or the custom of the Malays, or with
respect to any matter of native law or custom in the State of Sabah or
Sarawak... [or] with the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such
matter or relating to religion, citizenship, or language." Id. art. 150, § (6A).
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The discretion afforded Parliament under the "emergency
powers" clause is broad; application of this discretion has also
been broad. Emergencies have been declared several times
during Malaysia's short history, with emergency legislation
resulting in 1964, 5 5 1966,56 1969,1 7 and 1977.58 Furthermore,
many of these emergency acts have not been revoked despite
cessation of the emergency.5 9 Thus, despite Malaysia's increasing
political and social stability, the nation remains in a legal state of
emergency. 60
This sense of emergency underlies many of
Malaysia's entertainment and information laws and illustrates the
government's continuing reliance on "public order"6 1 and
"hostility between different races"6 2 as justifications for its
restrictive legislation.
b. The Internal Security Act
The Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA)63 replaced a prefederation emergency regulation" and has been a favored tool of
Fundamental liberties such as freedom of speech are conspicuously absent from
this list. See Yusof, supranote 48, at 90.

The courts are also reluctant to strike down legislation imposed during
emergencies; however, hesitancy in these circumstances is not exclusive to
Malaysia's judiciary. Id. at 95-96.
55.
Parliament passed the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act of 1964,
responding to the opposition of the president of Indonesia to the creation of
Malaysia. LEE, supranote 11, at 102.
56.
This legislation was in response to "a constitutional impasse in
Sarawak." Id. But see CROUCH, supra note 16, at 78-79 (stating the declaration
was merely the mechanism used by the ruling party to remove an elected state
government led by an opposition party).
57.
A nation-wide state of emergency existed after the May 13 race riots.
LEE, supranote 11, at 102. See supraPart H.A.
58.
This emergency concerned a political crisis in Kelantan and led to the
administration of the state by the federal government. LEE, supranote 11, at 102.
But see CROUCH, supra note 16, at 78-79 (arguing the emergency was only a
conflict between leaders of UMNO and the government in Kelantan, which was
controlled by members of the opposition, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)).
59.
LEE, supra note 11, at 102. For example, the 1964 Act remains in
effect, despite the goodwill now existing between Indonesia and Malaysia. Id.
Under art. 150, § (7), a Proclamation of Emergency expires after six months,
MALAY. CONST. art. 150, § (7), but article 149 does not contain this sunset
provision. Id. art. 149, § (2).
60.
See Yusof, supra note 48, at 124-25 (arguing, in 1983, for the
revocation of the proclamations, except the 1969 emergency declaration).
61.
Under MALAY. CONST. art. 149, § (1)(f), emergency legislation is
authorized when an action "is prejudicial to public order in... the Federation."
62.
Id. art. 149, § (1)(c).
63.
Internal Security Act, No. 82 (1992) [hereinafter ISA].
64.
Nijar, supra note 32, at 91. The British created the Emergency
Regulations of 1948 to respond to a communist rebellion. CROUCH, supra note
16, at 78. When they expired in 1960, Parliament adopted the ISA. Id.
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the government. 6 5 It allows the Minister of Home Affairs to detain
without trial 6 6 any person who might detract from the nation's
security.6 7 Originally intended to combat communism, the Act
has also been justified as a means of preventing racial violence. 68
In practice, political opponents have been the government's
favored targets. 6 9
Prominent members of the government,
including the editor of the New Straits Times,70 have also been

71
detained under the Act.
To prevent judicial challenges by persons detained under the
Act, Parliament amended the ISA in 1989.72 Section 8B of the Act
limits judicial review73 to issues of procedure. 74 Of course, the
procedures required for complying with an act authorizing
detention without trial are minimal. Thus, it is not surprising
that these restrictions have successfully precluded all challenges
to detentions under this act. 75

65.
"Between 1960 and 1981, 3,102 people were detained at one time or
another under the ISA."
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 80.
Mahathir's
administration has not resorted to the ISA as often as prior administrations. Yet,
in 1991, 142 people were still being detained, although the number decreased to
52 by the end of 1993. Id. at 81. More than 100 people were also arrested during

the constitutional crisis of 1987. Id.
66.
The Minister of Home Affairs can detain persons for as long as two
years. ISA § 8(6). This sentence can be extended by consecutive terms of as long
as two years. Id. § 8(7).
67.
Id. § 8(1).
The act authorizes detention even when the person
threatens the nation's "economic life" or interferes with "the maintenance of
essential services." "Essential services" include water services, electricity, postal
services, telephone, telegraph, public transportation, and radio and television
broadcasting. Id. §§ 8(2) & 8(3) (incorporating the Third Schedule).
68.
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 81.
69.
Democratic Action Party (DAP) leaders have been detained frequently,
and leaders of a Muslim opposition party were detained in 1990. Id. at 82. In
1994, the leaders of a nonviolent Islamic organization were detained. Id. Leaders
of environmental, religious, and human rights groups, as well as some common
criminals, have also been detained under the act. Id. at 81-82.
70.
The New Straits Times is one of oldest and most respected Malaysian
newspapers. Hashim, supranote 12, at 88.
71.
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 82.
72.
Id.
73.
Judicial review is defined broadly to include all proceedings, including
the consideration of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. ISA § 8C.
74. There shall be no judicial review in any court of, and no court shall
have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of, any act done or decision
made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Minister in the exercise of their
discretionary power in accordance with this Act, save in regard to any
question on compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act
governing such act or decision.
Id. § 8B(l).
75.
For an analysis of Singapore's similar ISA, see Cheng Vincent v.
Minister for Home Affairs, [19901 S.L.R. 190 (Sing.), available in 1990 SLR LEXIS
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The drafters of the ISA devoted two chapters to the regulation
of the entertainment and the mass media industries. Chapter III
authorizes the minister responsible for printing presses and
76
publications to prohibit or restrict the publication, possession,
and dissemination of documents believed likely to incite violence
or disobedience to the law, to promote racial or class hostility, or
to compromise "the national interest, public order, or security of
Malaysia."7 7 In addition, the careless may run afoul of the
authorities under the ISA if they are responsible for spreadingby any means-"false reports . . . or false statements likely to
cause public alarm."7 8 Although a censored proprietor of a
publication may object to the king, the king's decision is final and
7 9
cannot be questioned by the courts.

Chapter IV empowers the Minister to demand information
about any exhibit or performance scheduled in Malaysia. 80 The
Minister is free to prohibit or impose on the event any conditions
he deems necessary, 8 1 and may even prohibit 8 2 or close an
event. 83 In addition, the promoter must attend the event. 8 4 The

297, in which the court held the ISA had "excluded any right ofjudicial review on
the grounds of illegality, irrationality, and unconstitutionality of any detention
orders".
76.
The possession of documents forbidden under § 22 is punishable by a
fine of as much as one thousand ringgit and a prison term of one year. ISA §
25(1). The possession of subversive documents is punishable by ten thousand
ringgit and imprisonment for five years. Id. § 29(1). A subversive document is
defined as one designed to "excite organised violence" or to advocate actions
punishable under the ISA. Id. § 29(3). A person prosecuted for the possession of
a subversive document is presumed to have known it was subversive, but this
presumption can be rebutted by proving ignorance "to the satisfaction of the
court." Id. § 29(4).
77.
Id. § 22(1). In contrast to Chapter II, individuals charged with a
Chapter III violation, the possession of subversive or prohibited documents, are
entitled to a court proceeding for a determination of guilt or innocence. Id. § 25(1).
78.
Id. § 28. In 1996, the Star was warned to stop reporting on rumors
that a vampire had appeared to rural villagers. Syed Azhar, Police: Stop Rumours
About Vampire, STAR (Malay.), Nov. 21, 1996 (copy of file with Author).
79.
ISA § 23. But see generally Nijar, supra note 32 (arguing that the
natural justice principle of a "right to be heard" and the notion of procedural due
process may still allow judicial intervention). This approach has been rejected in
Singapore, where the ISA remained in force after Singapore's departure from the
Federation.
Id- at 95 (citing Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs,
Singapore, 2 M.L.J. 137 (1971)).
80.
ISA § 32(1). The Minister or an agent thereof is free to obtain in writing
any information whatsoever about the performance or exhibit.
The act
contemplates that the minister will be interested in the "particulars' of the
promoters and participants of the event, their "interests," and their expected use
of revenues from the event. Id- § 32(1) (a)-(d).
81.
Id. § 33(1).

82.

Id. § 35.

83.

Id. § 39.

84.

Id. § 34.
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police may conduct searches without a warrant s s and make
seizures 8 6 if they suspect a violation of the ISA. As a result of
these provisions and their use in causes such as the promotion of
morality and racial harmony, promoters are extremely cautious.
The range of justifications available for imposing onerous
restrictions and criminal sanctions results in a high level of selfcensorship.

Recent developments provide encouraging signs that the
government might begin weaning itself from the power granted by
the ISA. In 1996, the prime minister indicated that the ISA will
be reviewed,8 7 and opposition party leaders have sought
limitations on the ISA for years.8 8 But, until the government acts
to reduce the ISA's impact, it will remain a key aspect of
Malaysia's system of censorship.
c. The Sedition Act
The Sedition Act creates substantial barriers to the free
discussion of political matters and government actions. Like the
ISA, the Sedition Act was adopted in 1948 by the British
government and was expanded by Malaysia's government after
the May 13 riots in 1969.8 9 Originally designed to circumscribe
Malay discontent with the colonial government, the Sedition Act's
definitions of sedition now includes speech that has a tendency
"to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races
or classes," 90 and speech that questions "any matter, right,
status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established
or protected by the provisions of Part III of the Federal
Constitution or Article 152, 153, or 181 of the Federal
Constitution."9 1 In 1971, Parliament amended the Act to ban
discussion of these and other sensitive matters even by members
of Parliament. 92

85.
86.
87.

Id. § 37.
Id. § 38.
Internal Security Act to be Reviewed: Dr. M, Bus. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at

20, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXTLINE File.
88.
See, e.g., Roger May, Opposition Mounts Foreign Campaign to Get

Leaders Released, REUTER LIBR. REP., Jan. 28, 1988, available in LEXIS, News

Library, REUWLD File.
89.
90.
91.

CROUCH, supranote 16, at 82-83.
Sedition Act 15 (1948) § 3(1)(e).
Sedition Act § 3(1)(f), Part III of the Constitution relates to citizenship.

Article 152 makes Malay the national language, article 153 requires that the
government give special treatment to bumiputeras, and article 181 concerns the
sovereignty of the rulers. Section 3(1)( of the Sedition Act was added by an
emergency ordinance issued by the king in 1970. LEE, supranote 11, at 111.
92.
LEE, supra note 11, at 115-19 (discussing the Constitution
(Amendment) Act of 1971 and its effects).
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The Sedition Act has achieved its intended effect of
constraining discussion on the most controversial issues affecting
Malaysia. In a noteworthy case, 9 3 Dr. Ooi Kee Saik of the
Democratic Action Party (DAP) was convicted of uttering seditious
words when he delivered a speech 94 containing references to six
instances of government policy favoring Malays. 9 5 The court
found that these "scurrilous attacks on one ethnic group and...
false views played a significant part in creating racial tensions
that on another occasion had resulted in race riots;" 96 however,

the court refused to sentence Dr. Ooi to jail, instead fining him
2000 ringgit.

97

Political opponents of the ruling political alliance have been
the most frequent targets of the Sedition Act. Outside news
sources and authors are similarly restricted by this Act. The
Sedition Act seems to benefit Malays most often; bumiputeras
seem to receive much greater latitude when criticizing other racial
groups. 98 An important result of the Sedition Act's selective
application has been an increase in the difficulty faced by
opposition parties as they attempt to generate the political
pressure necessary to force the ruling alliance to address issues
affecting minority ethnic groups. Another disturbing result is
that Asian writers have responded to this regulation by imposing
a large measure of self-censorship. 9 9 A successful democracy
cannot accurately represent the ideals of its citizens when elected
representatives and members of the press are prohibited from
discussing the nation's most pressing issues.

93.
Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik & Ors., 2 M.L.J. 108 (O.Cr.J. 1971)
(upheld by the Federal Court on Sept. 16, 1971 by a majority of four to one).
94.
Dr. Ooi gave the speech on the release from prison of Mr. Lim Kit

Siang, secretary-general of the DAP. Id. at 109. Lim Kit Siang had been detained
under the ISA. Id.
95.
Id. at 112.
96.

Id. at 112-13.

97.
As of November 1997, 2000 ringgit is the equivalent of U.S.$620. Each
of Ooi's co-defendants, the printers and publishers of his speech, was convicted
and fined the same amount as Ooi. Id. at 114.
98.
See Public Prosecutor v. Mark Koding, [1982] 2 M.L.J. 120 (1982),
available in 1982 MLJ LEXIS 35, affd, [1982] 1 M.L.J. 111 (1982), available in
1982 M.J LEXIS 90 (Kuala Lumpur 1993) (finding a Malay Parliament member
guilty of only a technical violation of the Sedition Act, undeserving of punishment,
when he questioned the government's policy of allowing Chinese and Tamil
schools to continue in Malaysia and the use of Chinese and Tamil on road
signboards, and suggested an amendment to Article 152 of the Constitution). But
see Malaysia: Human Rights Practices, 1992, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 1993,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, DSTATE File (stating that Chinese language
newspapers published in languages are less widely circulated and more free in
reporting on sensitive political and social issues).
99.
Asian Writers Say They Censor Themselves, UPI, Oct. 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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d. The Official Secrets Act
Before the 1986 amendment of the Official Secrets Act of
1972 (OSA), the act applied to any unauthorized publication of
government-held information, notwithstanding its insignificance
or the public's awareness of the information. 0
An important
case arising before the enactment of these amendments involved

Lim Kit Siang, who was convicted for disseminating information
about the navy's purchase of ships under conditions suggesting
corruption. 10o
The amendment increased the jail terms of the OSA to a
minimum of one year and a maximum of fourteen. 102 It also
clarified the definition of an "official secret," restricting the scope
of the act to "cabinet and state executive council documents and
1 3
those relating to security, defense, and international relations."
Thus the amendment increased the number of documents
available to
opposition parties
and the public while
simultaneously adding mandatory jail terms to discourage
opposition parties and newspapers from using these documents
to expose government excesses and mistakes.1 0 4
As with
Malaysia's other national security regulations, the intended result
is to encourage self-restraint by political minorities, the news
media, and private citizens.
3. Mass Media Regulations
The unifying theme of the laws governing Malaysia's mass
media is a determination to protect citizens from amoral or,
alternatively, Western influences.
Although detailed, these
overlapping regulations form an amorphous whole, resulting in
ambiguity in defining the precise conduct proscribed by these
regulations. The government's history of applying these statutes
as broadly as possible has caused political and racial minorities to
protect themselves from prosecution by imposing a measure of
self-censorship.

100.

CROUCH, supranote 16, at 84.

101.
See Lirm Kit Siang v. Public Prosecutor, [1980] 1 M.L.J. 293 (1980),
available in 1979 Mid LEXIS 62 (Kuala Lumpur 1979) (upholding conviction and

fines totaling 8500 ringgit).
102. This change came as a response to newspapers that were content to
pay their journalists' fines. CROUCH, supra note 16, at 84.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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a. Cinematograph Films (Censorship) Act of 1952
The Cinematograph Act' 0 5 created the Film Censorship
Board, responsible for censoring all films shown in theaters or on
television.' 0 6 Possession of an uncensored film or videotape can
result in a fine and imprisonment.' 0 7 Board members l0 8 have
extremely broad discretion' 0 9 to implement the government's
directives to censor films containing elements of violence, horror,
sex, or counter-culture (VHSC).

Applying these general guidelines, the Board has banned a
number of popular U.S. films, including Schindler's List 1 10 and
Executive Decision."'
The children's movie Babe was almost
banned for its depiction of pigs. 112 Malaysians waited five years

105. Films (Censorship) Act, Act 35 (1952) (Malay.).
106. Hashim, supranote 12, at 152.
107. See Public Prosecutor v. Lim Yoo Hock, [1984] 1 M.L.J. 309 (1984),
available in 1984 MLJ LEXIS 22 (Ipoh 1984) (conviction reversed on procedural
grounds). Failure to comply with the act, however, will not result in a loss of
copyright in that work. Foo Loke Ying & Anor v. Television Broadcasts Ltd. &
Ors., [1985] 2 M.L.J. 35 (1985), available in 1985 MLJ LEXIS 15 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
108. The identity of Board members is a well-kept secret. Noraini Shariff,
The Censors are at it Again, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 4, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File (complaining about the Censorship Board's
excessive cuts, including the removal of "pig scenes" in Doc Hollywood).
109. Although such a case has only been reported once, the Board's
decisions can be challenged in court by citizens with a sufficient interest in the
matter. See George John v. Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn. Bhd., [1988] 1 M.L.J.
319 (1988), available in 1987 MIJ LEXIS 52 (Alor Setar 1987) (allowing a
certifiably monogamous citizen to challenge the Board's decision to allow a film
entitled Happy Bigamist and an advertisement celebrating a "two wives in one
house" policy).
110. Labeling it propaganda because of its favorable portrayal and
emphasis on the Jewish race, the Board refused to release the movie. Although
Malaysia lifted the ban following international criticism, Steven Spielberg refused
to allow the movie to be shown in censored form. William Branigin, In Manila and
OtherAsian Capitals,Movie CensorsAre Alive and Kicking Up a Fuss, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 17, 1994, availablein LEXIS, News Library, IHUT File.
111. Film on Muslim FanaticsMay Be Banned, NEvw STRAITS TIMEs, Mar. 15,
1996, at 25, available inLEXIS, News Library, STRAIT File. Executive Decision also
caused an uproar among Arab-Americans because of the movie's depiction of
Muslims as violent religious zealots. Id.
112. Hafidah Samat, Babe May Be Screened Next Month, NEW STRAiTS TIMEs,

Apr. 17, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT Fie.

The

government's hesitation because of Muslim opposition to eating pork caught
Hollywood by surprise. Judith Miller, Making Money Abroad, and Also a Few
Enemies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at 11. Scenes from the movie shown during
the Academy Awards were cut in Malaysia. Joan Lau, Comic Fable of Babe that
Endears,NEW STRAITS TIMES, June 1, 1996, at 4, availableinLEXIS, News Library,
NSTRTT File. This reaction to pig scenes was not the first: pig scenes in Doe
Hollywood and Unforgiven had previously been edited. See Reuters/Variety
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for the opportunity to rent a heavily edited Basic Instinct.1 13 Even
Malaysian films have not escaped a ban the Board.1 1 4
An
example is Amok, a highly anticipated movie directed by one of
Malaysia's
leading directors,
banned
for its
"negative
elements." 115 In January 1996, the government implemented a
rating system for television programs and films.1 1 6 But despite
categories for general viewing and "above 18,"117 censors continue
to be active, even on programs cleared for all audiences.1 18

EntertainmentSummary, Reuters N. Am. Wire, June 5, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, REUNA File (mentioning the censorship of Unforgiven) and Sharif,
supranote 108.
113.
Errol Oh, 'Basic Instinct' Here at Last, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 28,
1997, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, INSTIRIT File. Under a new name
and without the sex scenes, the movie is 30 minutes shorter. Id.
114. Indian movies, however, may receive more lenient treatment because
of their limited audience. See Brendan Pereira, Tamil Movies Under Fire from
Indian Groups, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Feb. 14, 1997, at 24, available in LEXIS, News
Library, STRAIT File.
115. Banned under § 19(3) of the Censorship Act, the movie cost 800,000
ringgit to make. The director reported it would take another 400,000 ringgit to
eliminate the excessive "negative elements including the belief in the
supernatural, sex and violence ... [and] scenes that were unIslamic [sic] and not
in keeping with Malay culture." RM800,000 Malay Movie 'Amok' Banned by
Censors, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at 2, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NSTRTT File. In 1991, Fantasia(Teletrade Communications) was also
banned, although it was allowed to be shown as Fantasi two years later, after
being "reshot and overhauled." Id. The ban on Amok surprised the local film
industry.
Id.
Even before his movie was banned, Amok's producer had
commented that "'[clensorship is the worst enemy of our film industry.'"
Baharudin Latif & Don Groves, Film Censorship Board Termed Fickle, at Best,
VARIETY, Aug. 22, 1994, at 38.
116.
Zainal Alam Kadir, Rating System, but Cuts Still Rule, NEW STRAITS
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 4, availablein LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File.
117.
Id. Programs for general viewing receive a "U" rating, while "over 18"
films are labeled as follows:
18SG (programmes which do not depict excessive violence and horror),
18SX (those which do not depict excessive sex scenes), 18PA (programmes
which discuss religious, social and political issues) and 18PL (those which

contain a combination of any two of the categories). Films classified for
viewers above 18 can only be screened on television and cinemas after
10pm while those categorised under general viewing (U) can be screened
at any time.
Id.
118.
Id. See also Suraya AI-Attas, CensorshipBoard Runs Riot with Rating,
NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 18, 1997, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT
File (complaining about the 18SX rating for the television program Friendsdespite
the censors' silencing of objectionable language throughout the show).
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b. The Printing Press and Publications Act of 1984
The British enacted Malaysia's first Printing Press Act in
1948 after a communist uprising.1 1 9 While the original law
sought to deter further communist organizing, the modem act
has been broadened, implicitly reflecting the government's
concern with maintaining race relations. 120 The Printing Press
Act regulates
all publications,
documents,
and audio

recordings

21

in an effort to eliminate obscene materials 12 2 and

items that could 'promote feelings of ill-will, hostility, enmity,
hatred, disharmony or disunity."1 23 All printing presses 1 24 must
be licensed annually. 125 Documents and items printed or created
12 6
in other countries may also be censored or banned.
Although the Printing Press Act appears to grant the
government
absolute
authority
to
ban
virtually
any
communication located within its borders, it was strengthened
after 1987 to give the Minister of Home Affairs complete
discretion, not susceptible to judicial review. 12 7 During this time,
the government has revoked the licenses of three majors

119. Hashim, supranote 12, at 149.
120. Id. at 150 (noting that "[p]ast events have shown just how easily social
harmony can be threatened... if the media in Malaysia were allowed complete
freedom of expression.").
121. Printing Presses and Publications Act of 1984 (Act 301), pt. I, § 2
(defining "publication" to include audio recordings and anything containing "any
visible representation" or anything which is "capable of suggesting words or
ideas.").
122. Id. pt. II, §4(1) (a).
123. Id. pt. I, § 4(1) (b). Part IV of the act further defines undesirable
publications that may be proscribed as anything that:
contains any article, caricature, photograph, report, notes, writing, sound,
music, statement or any other thing which is in any manner prejudicial to
or likely to be prejudicial to public order, morality, security, the
relationship with any foreign country or government, or which is or likely

to be contrary to any law or is othenvise prejudicial to or is likely to be
prejudicial to public interest or national interest.
Id- pt. IV § 7(1).
124. The act defines "printing press" as any machine "capable of printing at
a rate of 1,000 impressions per hour or more." Id. at Sch. I. The Minister of
Home Affairs has the authority to update this definition. Id. pt. II, § 7.
125. Id. pt. III, § 5-6 (publishing or importing newspapers without a license
can result in imprisonment for three years and/or a fine of 20,000 ringgit). See
also Hashim, supranote 12, at 149-50.
126. Id. pt. IV, § 7(2), § 9. A publisher who runs afoul of the minister may
have future editions of a periodical banned. See id. pt. IV, § 7(2)(b). Even the
publisher's other publications may be denied circulation. Id. pt. IV, § 7(2)(c).
127. CROUCH, supra note 16, at 85.
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newspapers. 12 8 After its suspension, the popular 12 9 English
newspaper The Star no longer carried a column written by a
often disagreed with the policies of
former prime minister who
30
current UMNO leaders.1
Acting under authority of the Printing Press Act, the
government has banned issues of foreign publications, including
Time, FarEastern Economic Review, InternationalHerald Tribune,
Although less popular periodicals have been
and Asiaweek-i 3s
able to obtain licenses, the government has conditioned licenses
on limited circulation. Editors have also learned to impose a
measure of self-censorship. 13 2 The government has similarly
banned a number of books under this act, including some
books
academic works on Malaysian politics. 133 Yet, several
34
freely.'
circulate
to
continue
government
the
criticizing
The judiciary has not blunted the impact of this act. In 1994,
the Supreme Court upheld the act's constitutionality, holding it
within the orbit of article 10, § 2(a) of the Constitution. 135 After
noting that the dissemination of false news is only punishable
under the act if it has been "maliciously published," 136 the Court

stated that § 8A(2) of the act merely creates a presumption of
malice, rebuttable by the defendant. 13 7 Reasoning that the act
would result in more careful and responsible news coverage, the

128.
The government revoked the licenses of "the English-medium Star, the
Chinese Sin Chew JitPoh, and the Malay weekly Watan." Id at 85.
129.
The Star,controlled by the Malaysian Chinese Association, had become
almost as popular as the UMNO-controlled New Straits Times, the oldest Englishlanguage newspaper in Malaysia. Id. at 86.
Id. at 86-87.
130.
131.
Id. at 85. See also Dato Seri Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad v. Derk
Davies & Anor, [1989] 1 M.L.J. 528 (1989), available in 1988 MUJ LEXIS 172
(Kuala Lumpur 1988) (allowing the prime minister's suit against Far Eastern
Economic Review to proceed while dismissing the periodical's indemnity and
contribution claims against the Minister of Home Affairs and the government of
Malaysia, both of which had consented to circulation of the offending articles).
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 85. Critical publications such as the Aliran
132.
Monthly have also struggled to find printers willing to risk prosecution. Id.
133.
Id- at 88.
134.
Two such books are Time Bombs in Malaysiaby Lim Kit Siang and Tun
Salleh Aba's May Day for Justice, describing the events surrounding his removal
as Lord President of the Supreme Court. Id.
135.
Public Prosecutor v. Pung Chen Choon, [1994] 1 M.L.J. 566 (1994),
available in 1994 M.L.J. LEXIS 25, at *33-34 (Sup. Ct. 1994). Although the Court
denied the defendant's constitutional challenge, it also rejected the government's
argument that the Court lacked constitutional authority to consider the act's
constitutionality. Id. at *31. The defendant, editor of The Borneo Mail, had
written an article in 1990 discussing the arrest of a Catholic priest under the ISA
and the government's desire to arrest several other priests who had evaded the
police. Id. at *13.
Id. at *28.
136.
Id. at *40.
137.
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Court actually applauded the act because it "promotes and
ensures that freedom of the press is neither abused nor
exploited." 138
c. The Broadcasting Act of 1988
Before 1988, Malaysian broadcasting was closely managed by
the Ministry of Information through the Department of
Broadcasting, better known as Radio Television Malaysia
(RTM). 13 9
RTM continues to operate as a "public service
broadcasting station," responsible for all government mass media;
however, its broadcasting monopoly ended when Malaysia began
systematically privatizing its broadcast services in 1985.140
To facilitate its privatization, the government adopted the
Broadcasting Act of 1988, 141 governing the use of broadcast
services within Malaysia. 14 2 Under this statute, the minister 1'4
responsible for broadcasting has the power to issue 14 4 and revoke
licenses.145
Among the seven reasons for revocation are a

licensee's failure to comply with the Broadcasting Act, 1 "6 noncompliance with "direction given by the Minister," 14 7 and the
minister's determination that termination is "advisable in the

138.
139.

Id.
The stated objective of RTM is as follows:

To provide broadcasting services and disseminate information through
radio and television broadcasts with the aim of building individual
attitude, thinking and proper values for the social and economic
development in line with national aspirations.
Radio
Television
Malaysia,
Objective
(visited
Oct.
29,
1997)
<http://spl.pnm.my/-rtm/rtml.htm>.
140. CROUCH, supra note 16, at 88. See generally Hashim, supra note 12
(discussing the privatization of Malaysia's broadcasting services).
141. Privatization and the Broadcasting Act have largely supplanted the
Telecommunications Act of 1950. The Telecommunications Act still governs the
licensing and use of radio and television equipment and creates criminal
penalties: § 29 provides that a person who transmits a "false or fabricated"
message can be fined and imprisoned for three years. The act also empowers the
Ministers of Information and Telecommunication to make any regulations deemed
necessary. Telecommunications Act of 1950, Act 20, pt. I1, 27 (1970).
142. Broadcasting Act of 1988, Act 338.
143. To assist in the regulation of broadcasting, the minister may delegate
all or a portion of his authority except to the power to make resolutions to anyone
of his choice. Id. pt. V, § 20.
144. Id. pt. H, § 4.
145. Id. pt. H, §§ 8-9. Before suspension or revocation for a violation of any

of the reasons in § 9(1), the licensee will have the opportunity to "show cause" as
to why the license should not be suspended or revoked. Id. pt. II, § 9(2).
146. Id. pt. I, § 9(b).
147. Id. pt. I, § 9(e).

1998]

CENSORSHIPIN MALAYSIA

public interest, for a special reason." 148 Although no reported
case has interpreted this last provision, the "public interest"
would presumably include the national policy goals identified in
other legislation, such as the reduction of discussion focusing on

racial and religious issues, the airing of political criticisms, and
the protection of the public's morality. This broad regulatory
power includes some of the largest penalties available within
Malaysia's media regulations. Broadcasting without a license is
hundred thousand ringgit
punishable by a fine of as much as one
14 9
or three years' imprisonment or both.
In addition to the power to issue and revoke licenses, the
minister can prohibit a station from "broadcasting any matter, or
matter of any class or character."1 5 0 The only limitation imposed
on the minister's power is that his actions must not contravene
the act.1 5 ' A violation of the minister's directions may result in
investigation and a
the forfeiture of any equipment seized during
52
fine of as much as fifteen hundred ringgit.1
Before 1996, the government had employed the Broadcasting
Act and the Telecommunications Act to ban all satellite dishes
from the country.'l 3 After launching two national satellites and
committing to developing the nation's information, entertainment,
and multimedia industries, the government partially reversed its
decision to ban satellite dishes in late 1996.154 Although other
satellite dishes remain unauthorized,1 5 5 small dishes capable only
of receiving signals from Malaysia's national satellites are now
legal. With this technology,' s 6 Malaysians willing to pay1 5 7 for

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. pt.
Id. pt.
Id. pt.
Id. pt.

II, § 9(g).
II, § 5.
1I,§ 10(2).
11, § 10(3).

152.

Id. pt. II, § 18.

153.

Parliamentto Plug Loopholes on SatelliteDishes, NEW STRArTS TIME , Oct.

13, 1992, at 16, availablein LEXIS, News Library, STRAIT File.
154.

The amendments are not yet available; however, the Ministry of

Information has used its authority to adopt the legislation before their official
adoption. Sabah, Sarawak Folk Told to Take Down Illegal Dish, STAR ONLINE,

(visited Jan. 25, 1997) <http://www.jaring.my/star/current/ 25jwpa.htl>.
155.

Id.

156. The "state of the art? digital reception and Ku-Band technology used
for this service were previously available only in the United States and Germany.
Melanie Proctor & Zieman, Sky's the Limit for TV and Radio, NEW STRAiTS TIMES,
Dec. 30, 1996, at 3, availablein LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File.
157. Malaysians willing to pay for television may also receive broadcasts via
MegaTV. Since late 1995, this subscription service includes "five channels of
news, documentaries, sports, movies and cartoon and variety," including CNN.
See Ali Deraman, Dearthin Quality Local TV Programmes,NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan.
26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. See also Elaine Lim,
Mega TV Service Next Month, NEw STRAITS TIMES, June 23, 1995, at 5, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File.
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services provided by the All Asia Television & Radio Company
(ASTRO) I5 8 now receive twenty-two channels, including Malay,
Chinese, and Indian channels, HBO, MTV, 15 9 ESPN, NBC, CNN,
and the Disney Channel. 6 0 A three-tiered censorship system that

filters-out

objectionable

content

necessitates

broadcasting

delays.161
Finally, all mass media advertisements must comply with the
Malaysian Code of Advertising Practice. 162 The code affords the
government broad discretion to restrict advertising, posing
problems not only for businesses struggling to comply, 163 but
also for minority political parties. Although UMNO was barred
from advertising on radio or television, newscasts and montages
describing Mahathir's achievements with background songs such
as "I Can See Clearly Now" and "Ain't No Mountain High Enough"
became common during the elections in 1995.164
Again,
recitations of national and racial unity as justifications lack
credibility when only the ruling party is allowed to advertise its
political message, albeit implicitly.

158. Proctor & Zieman, supranote 156, at 3.
159. MTV's content raised serious concerns for the Malaysian government
because many of the videos shown are those of music groups that were banned
by the Ministry of Information. See Geoff Burpee & Alexandra Nuvich, Malaysian
Government Expresses Concern over Music-TV Content, BILLBOARD, Aug. 10, 1996,
at 43. MTV satisfied these concerns by tailoring the channel to Malay standards.
The channel now offers Indian and Mandarin hit songs and is produced by
Malays. Baharudin Latif, MTV Goes Local in Malaysia, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 15,
1996, at 39, available in LEXIS, News Library, DLYVTY File.
In addition, MTV's cartoon characters Beavis and Butthead are not included
in MTV's programming in Malaysia. Brendan Pereira, Barring Yellow Culturefrom
the Skies, NEW STRArTS TMES, Dec. 1, 1996, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library,
STRAIT File.
160. In addition to the 20 new channels, ASTRO carries two public RTM
channels and eight radio stations. The service has pay-per-view and "near-videoon-demand" capabilities, and the station's chief operating officer has promised
expansions to include interactive multimedia applications and Internet access.
Deraman, supra note 157, at 7.
161. Workers hired by ASTRO dub, subtitle, censor, and provide ratings for
every broadcast in accordance with the Ministry of Information's guidelines.
Television station censors can also ban broadcasts. Finally, home viewers are
equipped with controls to block out undesirable programs. Pereira, supra note
159, at 8.
162. Hashim, supra note 12, at 154. See also id. at 277 (providing excerpts
and a discussion of the advertising code).
163. See Shengliang Deng et al., Advertising in Malaysia-a Cultural
Perspective, 13 INT'L J. ADVER. 153 (1994) (advising foreign businesses about
advertising in Malaysia).
164. Stephen Duthie, Mahathir'sCoalition Wins Easily, Boasting its Majority,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, AWS File.
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C. Shifting the Balance: The Effect of Speech Restrictions and
Media Control on Malaysia'sPoliticalInstitutions
Influenced by the British parliamentary system, 165 Malaysia's
Constitution divides power among three branches: the legislature,
the executive, and the judiciary.1 6 6 Yet the constitutional ideal is

far from reality. A series of political struggles and constitutional
amendments have given the prime minister and Parliament an
inordinate amount of power. Understanding the reality of the
balance of power-or lack thereof-in Malaysia is essential for a

complete understanding of the effect restrictions on the freedom
of expression have had on Malaysia's democracy.
1. The Constitutional Crisis of 1988: Limiting the Judiciary's
Independence
In 1988, the judicial branch suffered a loss of independence
during a dramatic constitutional struggle 167 involving the prime
minister, the king, and the head of the Supreme Court. 168 In
early 1988, Tun Dato' Haji Mohammed Salleh bin Abas, then Lord
President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia, wrote a letter to the
king. 16 9 The letter, written on behalf of "all the Judges of the
country," expressed disappointment with "various comments and

165. See MADDEX, supra note 9, at 166 ("Modeled on India's constitution,
the Malaysian constitution was also influenced by the U.S. Constitution and the
British Parliamentary model.").
166.
See Yeong Sien Seu, Note, Clarity or Controversy - The Meaning of
Judicial Independence in Singapore and Malaysia, 13 SING. L. REv. 85, 85 (1992).
Malaysia's Constitution also reflects the nation's underlying ethnic diversity. It
contains a detailed explication of the qualifications of citizenship, a matter of
extreme importance in Malaysia given the political volatility attached to ethnic
identities. See MALAY. CONST. pt. III (entitled Citizenship). This section is longer
than the first two parts of the Constitution, respectively labeled "The States,
Religion and Law of the Federation" and "Fundamental Liberties." Id. pts. I-il.
167. These events have been the subject of a number of scholarly articles.
See, e.g., R.H. Hickling, The Malaysian Judiciary in Crisis, [1989] PUB. LAW 20;
Andrew Harding, The 1988 ConstitutionalCrisis in Malaysia, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.

57 (1990); H. P. Lee, A FragileBastion Under Siege-The 1988 Convulsion in the
MalaysianJudiciary, 17 MELB. U. L. REV. 386 (1990).

168. The Constitution designates that the president of the court will be
called "the Lord President." MALAY. CONST. art. 122, § (1). The Supreme Court,
Malaysia's "court of last resort," is located in Kuala Lumpur. Id. art. 121, § (2).
This court hears appeals from two High Courts: a High Court of Malaya, located
in Kuala Lumpur, and a High Court in Borneo, located, by the king's designation,
in Sabah or Sarawak. Id. art. 121, § (1)-(2).
169. See LEE, supranote 11, at 44.
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accusations made by the Honorable Prime Minister against the
Judiciary, not only outside but within Parliament." 170
Tun Salleh's letter was merely the last straw; a series of
judicial actions had already provoked the prime minister. In
1987, the Supreme Court decided J.P. Berthelsen v. DirectorGeneral of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors, 17 1 in which the Court
reinstated an employment pass belonging to a U.S. staff
correspondent for the Asian Wall Street Journal's Kuala Lumpur
office.172
This decision allowed the reporter to remain in

Malaysia.

The court's decision frustrated the prime minister1 7 3

170. Id. Later claiming he had sought to avoid a confrontation, Tun Salleh
intimated that he had drafted the letter only after a judge of the High Court had
threatened to speak out against the prime minister. I. at 45. According to Tun
Salleh, the author of the letter was Judge Abdul Razak. Id. at 78 n.7. Judge
Abdul Razak also sent a letter to the Chief Justice Malaya, the man who later
replaced Tun Salleh. Id. at 45. Originally Tun Salleh had planned to remain
quiet during these criticisms, but in January 1988, the Lord President began to
believe that continued silence would erode public confidence in the judiciary. Id.
at 78 n.6. His response to the prime minister's comments came during an official
book launching event. It.
171.
[1987] 1 M.L.J. 134 (1987), available in 1986 MW LEXIS 240 (Kuala

Lumpur 1986).
172. The Director-General had determined that Berthelsen had violated the
Immigration Act and the Immigration Regulations, and that his presence
endangered national security. Relying on principles of natural justice, the Court
reversed this determination, holding the pass cancellation had denied Berthelsen
the opportunity to make "whatever representations he thought necessary in the
circumstances." Id- at *15.
173.
Shortly after Berthelsen, the prime minister vented this frustration in a
magazine interview. IKnow How the People Feel, TIME, Nov. 24, 1986, at 18. The
excerpts of this interview include the following statement by Dr. Mahathir:
The judiciary says, "Although you passed a law with a certain thing in
mind, we think your mind is wrong, and we want to give our
interpretation."... We know exactly what we want to do, but once we do
it, it is interpreted in a different way, and we have no means to interpret it
our war ....
[We will have to find a way of producing a law that will have
to be interpreted according to our wish.
Id. at 18. For a more recent statement of Mahathir's opinions on the judiciary,
see Prime Minister's Office, A Unique Political System (visited Feb. 2, 1997),
<http://smpke.jpm.my: 1025/testbox/aO lc03.htm>:
Judicial review cannot be unlimited. If it is, then ...
it will not be the
elected representatives who will govern, but the Judiciary. Since the
Judiciary is not chosen by the people, then Government by the Judiciary
will negate the democratic concept of Government by the People. It is
sufficient for the courts and the judges to be free from interference by the
Executive or the Legislative bodies. Pressure, in the form of threats to
remove them, cannot be applied in order to influence their decisions.
In response to Mahathir's statements, Lim Kit Siang, the opposition leader in
Parliament, instituted a contempt of court action against the prime minister. See
supra Part II.B. 1 (describing the offense of "scandalizing the judiciary"). The High
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banned the newspaper
because the government had previously
17 4
and expelled another of its journalists.
In Public Prosecutorv. Dato' Yap Peng,175 a case destined to

exhaust Parliament's last ounce of patience, a majority of the
Supreme Court struck down a portion of the Criminal Procedure
Code as unconstitutional because it allowed Parliament to
interfere with the Court's freedom to grant and deny applications

on appeal. 17 6

Parliament reacted quickly by enacting the

Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1988,'177 which provided that
the Supreme Court would have "such other jurisdiction as may be
conferred by or under federal law."' 7 8 The broad language of this
amendment effectively eliminated the Court's freedom to decide
jurisdictional issues. 179
After the Lord President's letter had been delivered to the
i8 0
king, the king ordered the prime minister to take action.
Mahathir promptly investigated the matter and soon reported that
the Lord President's conduct had attained the level of misbehavior
contemplated by § 125(3) of the constitution.'18 He recommended
Pursuant to
the Lord President be removed from office.' 8 2

Court dismissed the case and the Supreme Court affirmed, but judges in both
cases offended the prime minister by noting that his statements resulted in
misperceptions about the role of the judiciary. LEE, supranote 11, at 47-48.
In an unrelated case also instigated by Lim Kit Siang, dissenting judges on the
High Court and Supreme Court implied that "some members of the judiciary were
prepared to exercise judicial control over executive actions." Id. at 50. See
Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 1 M.L.J. 50 (1988) (reprint of the
oral judgment of the Supreme Court).
174. LEE, supranote 11, at78 n.9.

175.

2 M.L.J. 311 (High Ct. 1987), rev'd, 2 M.L.J. 316 (Sup. Ct. 1987).

176. Under the code, the prosecutor could receive an automatic appeal
before the Supreme Court after an adverse ruling by the trial court. LEE, supra
note 11, at 51.
See id. at 52.
177.

178.

MALAY. CONST.art 121, § (2)(c).

179.
180.
181.

LEE, supranote 11, at 52.
Id. at 53.
Id.

If the Prime Minister, or the Lord President after consulting the Prime
Minister, represents to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong that a judge of the
Supreme Court ought to be removed on the ground of misbehaviour or of
inability, from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, properly to
discharge the functions of his office, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall
appoint a tribunal in accordance with Clause (4) and refer the
representationto it; and may on the recommendation of the tribunal remove
the judge from office.
MALAY. CONST. art. 125, § (3) (emphasis added).
LEE, supranote 11, at 53.
182.
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§ 125(4) of the Constitution, the king assembled a tribunal18 3 to
investigate the matter and suspended
the Lord President on the
84

prime minister's recommendation.1
The tribunal concluded that Tun Salleh should be removed

from office.1 8 5 The king set the Lord President's final day in office
as August 8, 1988.186 This date coincided with the scheduled
hearing of the "UMNO 11" case,1 8 7 a case that could have resulted
in the removal of Dr. Mahathir as leader of UMNO and as prime
minister.'
Not surprisingly, with the Lord President removed
from office and the remaining justices sufficiently intimidated, the
Supreme Court dismissed the case the next day. 189
Since 1988, the judiciary has been noticeably affected. 190
Courts may be unwilling to risk a decision opposing the

183.
The composition of the tribunal that heard the matter was
questionable. It included the chief justices of Malaya, Borneo, and Sri Lanka,
along with a judge of the Singapore High Court and two retired Malaysian judges.
Most objectionable was the inclusion as chairman of Tan Sri Abdul Hamid Omar,
the Chief Justice of Malaya. Not only had he been involved in the events
culminating in Tun Salleh's "judicial protest letter," but the Chief Justice stood to
replace Tun Salleh as Lord President if the Tribunal recommended dismissal.
LEE, supra note 11, at 52-57.
Tun Salleh's solicitors raised objections to the membership of the tribunal,
and the Malaysian Bar Council vigorously attacked the constitution of the
tribunal in a press statement. Id. at 55. Tom Salleh also requested that the
proceedings be held in public, but the request was denied. Id.
184.
Id. at 54. After leaving the country for medical treatment, Tun Salleh
returned in, mid-May to find himself at the center of a maelstrom. Id. at 53. On
May 28, 1988, he tendered his resignation, but he voided this decision the
following day. Id. at 54. He then called a press conference and consented to an
interview by the BBC.
Id. This was considered to be further evidence of

misbehavior. Id. The Lord President attempted to secure a legal restraint against
the tribunal, but when five Supreme Court judges granted his application, they
were investigated by a Second Tribunal for their "gross misbehavior." Id. at 56.

All five judges were suspended; two were later dismissed on the Second Tribunal's
recommendation. Id. at 57.
185. Id. at 56.
186. Id. at 57.
187. Mohamed Noor bin Otham v. Mohamed Yusof Jaafar, [1988] 2 M.L.J.
129 (1988).
188. LEE, supranote 11, at 52-53.
189. Id. at 57.
190. Harold Crouch writes:
Despite the fears of many, the judicial crisis of 1988 did not completely
destroy the independence of the judiciary. Since then, the courts have
continued to hand down occasional decisions that have been unfavorable
to the government. Nevertheless, any tendency to interpret the law in
ways that impose stricter limits on government prerogatives has been
nipped in the bud. When court decisions have threatened fundamental
government interests, the government has taken whatever action
necessary to defend its position.... The judges continue to be essentially
conservative custodians of a political system dominated by the Malay elite
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government's interests. The judiciary also has been left with a
carefully circumscribed role within the constitutional system. In

fact, the phrase "judicial power" has been deleted from the
The prime minister's ability to use speechConstitution. 19 1
related regulations to accomplish a major constitutional power

shift must be emphasized because speech regulations,
manipulation of the media, and public opinion were employed five
years later to restrict the monarchy.

2. The Monarchy and the Constitutional Crisis of 1993
Reflecting Malaysia's history as a federation of Islamic
sultanates, the Constitution provides for the election of a king
from among the historic royal families.1 92 The Yang di-Pertuan
Agong 93 serves as head of state and holds the executive power,
chiefly the power to appoint a prime minister and cabinet from

the membership of the ruling party. 19 4 The executive's powers,
however, are largely illusory: the king must appoint as prime
minister one whom he believes "likely to command the confidence
of the majority of the members of th[e] House." 195 Furthermore,
the cabinet must be chosen on the advice of the prime
minister.19 6 In practice, the king selects the leader of the ruling

party as prime minister, who subsequently selects his cabinet.
The Constitution granted members of the royal family
immunity from legal action, but in 1993 Parliament introduced a

constitutional amendment to limit this privilege.1 9 7

The king's

to which most judges belong. The crisis arose in part because of the prime
minister's lack of understanding of legal tradition and seems to be largely

a by-product of the UMNO crisis.

With the passing of that crisis,

government-judiciary relations were allowed to fall back into their old
mold.
CROUCH, supranote 16, at 142.

191.
Hickling, supranote 167, at 26.
192. The king "shall be elected by the Conference of Rulers for a term of five
or be removed from
years, but may at any time resign his office by writing ...
office by the Conference of Rulers, and shall cease to hold office on ceasing to be
a Ruler." MALAY. CONST. art. 32, § (3).
Yang di-PertuanAgong is the king's Malay title; the English translation
193.
is Supreme Head of the Federation. Id. art. 32, § (1).
194.
Id. arts. 40, §§ (2)(a), 4(3). The Yang di-PertuanAgong's powers also
include the right to grant pardons and to serve as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. Id. arts. 41-42.
195.
Id. art. 43, § (2)(a).
196.
Id. art. 43, § (2)(b).
The impetus behind Parliament's move to amend the Constitution was
197.
apparently the alleged assault of a school hockey coach by the Ruler of Johor.
LEE, supra note 11, at 86. Following a loss to a team from Perak, the Sultan's
The Malaysian Hockey Federation
son attacked the opposing goalkeeper.
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signature was necessary before the law could take effect, but the

royal families (the Rulers) objected to this limitation. 198 Despite
the provision of a Special Court to hear any of these cases, the
Rulers refused to sign. 199 Then Parliament threatened the Rulers
with the loss of various privileges. 2 °° The government-controlled
mass media began a daily barrage of stories featuring "revelations
of scandalous waste of public funds, misbehaviour of some Rulers
and [of their] extravagant life-styles."2 0 1 Finally, the Rulers
consented to the bill.2 0 2 Following this amendment, the Federal
Constitution proclaimed that the monarch 'shall take precedence
over all persons in the Federation and shall not be liable to any
proceedings
whatsoever in any court except in the Special
Court."20 3
Although announced as a victory for the rule of law in
Malaysia, the ease with which the prime minister wielded the

suspended the player. Id. at 87. Soon after this disciplinary measure, many of
the teams associated with the Malaysian Hockey Federation withdrew from a
major competition, presumably under pressure from the Sultan. Id. at 87. When
a hockey coach protested his "forced" withdrawal from the competition, he was
summoned to the Sultan's palace. Id. He emerged four hours later and issued a
press statement denying the truth of his prior allegations against the Sultan. Id.
A private clinic provided medical treatment to the coach the next day for cuts and
bruises on his face. Id. He subsequently filed a police report alleging that the
Sultan assaulted him at the palace. Id. The prime minister and UMNO seized
this opportunity to challenge the Rulers' immunity.
198. Under art. 66, § (3) of the Constitution, a bill must receive the assent
of the king following its passage by both houses of Parliament. MALAY. CONST. art.
66, § (3).
199. See LEE, supranote 11, at 89.
200. Id. at 93-94 (listing seven examples of methods the government
employed to make the royal families uncomfortable, including guidelines
promulgated to the television and radio networks to limit coverage of the royalty
to official occasions).
201. Id. at 93, 97 n.18 (quoting Rulers Can Still Live Well, NEW STRAITS TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File). The prime
minister also threatened to attempt an unprecedented legislative veto if the
Rulers continued to object. Id. at 90. This would have forced the Rulers to seek a
decision from the courts as to the legality of a veto. Id. It also would have been
an ironic twist, considering the monarchy's starring role in the judiciary's crisis of
1988. See supraPart .C.1. A leader in UMNO proclaimed that a legal challenge
would require proof of various objectionable actions of the ruling party as support
for the necessity of the amendment. LEE, supra note 11, at 95. Facing the
distinct possibility of a loss in court, and a continuing embarrassment by the
ruling party-in the press and in the courts-the Rulers backed down. Id. at 9395.

For a further exegesis of this and other political skirmishes between the
Rulers and the Parliament, see A. J. HARDING, THE CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF
THE MALAYSIAN MONARCHY, WORKING PAPER No. 4 (1993).
202.
Id.
203.
MALAY. CONST. art. 32, § (1) (emphasis added). See also MALAY. CONST.

pt. XV, "Proceedings against the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong and the Rulers."
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mass media and public opinion as weapons against the Rulers
raised concern about the degree of power enjoyed by the prime
minister.2 ° 4 These events were particularly ironic, considering
the king initiated the judicial crisis of 1988, which made legal
recourse unattractive to the Rulers during their own
constitutional crisis.
3. Running the Show: The Power of Parliament and the Prime
Minister

Notwithstanding the constitutional scheme of checks and
balances, since the constitutional crises of 1988 and 1993,
Parliament-headed by the prime minister-has wielded the
nation's power. Since the nation's birth, the Barisan Nasional, 20 5

an alliance of the "mainstream parties of the major ethnic groups
20 6

as well as assorted splinter parties," has ruled the country.
Dr. Mahathir, leader of UMNO, has headed the legislative branch
since 1981.2 0 7 Contributing to the power of Parliament is the

204.
"The fact that it was Dr. Mahathir alone who was able to unleash
public criticism and launch the constitutional reform shows the unique
concentration of power in his hands.'" LEE, supra note 11, at 99 n.32 (quoting
Robert Kershaw, Shattered Symbiosis: The Road to Conflict between Malay
Nationalism and Monarchy, 24 INTERNATIONALES ASIENFORUM 283 (1993)). See also
id. at 95-96.
205.
Barisan Nasional means "National Front." Hashim, supranote 12, at
60.
206.
Id. at 59-60. UMNO, the most popular Malay party, dominates within
the alliance. For a detailed analysis of UMNO's efforts to extend its support base
to non-Malays, see Case, supranote 25, at 72-78.
The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC), the other founding members of the Barisan Nasional, remain the most
powerful minority parties. Eleven parties now belong to the alliance. Hashim,
supranote 12, at 59-60. Opposition parties include those desiring a more Islamic
government, the PAS, and the DAP. Id.
207. Anthony Spaeth, Bound for Glory: He's Obsessed with Control and
Quick to Bash the West, but Mahathir Mohamad has Left his Mark on Malaysia,
TIME, Dec. 9, 1996 at 22. A trained physician and an early member of UMNO, Dr.
Mahathir was expelled from UMNO following the May 13 riots after Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Rahman took offense at Mahathir's allegations that he was "pro-

Chinese."

Id.

In 1972, the prime minister who succeeded Rahman allowed

Mahathir to return to the party, appointing him Education Minister in 1974. Id.
Within seven years, he had wrestled control of UMNO and become prime minister.
Id. His defiant attitude toward the West on foreign policy, environmental, and
human rights issues has won him wide popularity among developing nations.
Ismail Kassim, DatukAbdullahrPluses Outweigh Minuses, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar.
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. He has even been
rumored to be eyeing the position of secretary-general of the United Nations.
Malaysia Censors Mahathir'sLive Internet Debut, Reuters World Serv., Dec. 27,
1995, availablein LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
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ease with which the constitution can be amended.2 0 8
Before
becoming prime minister, Mahathir lamented that "[t]he manner,
the frequency and the trivial reasons for altering the Constitution
reduced this supreme law of the nation to a useless scrap of
paper."20 9
Yet during his fifteen years as prime minister,
21 0
Parliament has amended the Constitution ten times.
Although originally intended to improve festering race
relations, the various media and speech regulations have been
used by the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional to further its political

dynasty, eliminating intervening constitutional barriers. Because
the prime minister's objectives are now so easily converted into
statute, Dr. Mahathir's ideas for Malaysia have become extremely
important policy indicators.

III. PRESSURES ON MALAYSIA'S SYSTEM OF CENSORSHIP
The regulatory system UMNO employed to restrict the
dissemination of information is increasingly being challenged as
Malaysia enters the twenty-first century. UMNO's political control
seems to be weakening, global and national economies are
changing, and Malaysia's human rights practices are attracting
international attention. In addition, Malaysia must contend with
the administrative pressures created by the Internet.
These
pressures, and their combination, seem to be forcing Malaysia to
alter or abandon much of its regime of censorship.
A. Economic Pressures
Malaysia's recent economic history has been marked by
impressive success, averaging growth rates between eight and
nine percent during the last nine years.2 1 1
But Malaysia's
economy still exhibits further room for growth. The nation's per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1996 was $9,470, less
than half the GDP of Singapore or Hong Kong. 2 12 And while the
economy still relies heavily on manufacturing, "a fast-rising
standard of living and labor shortages threaten to price Malaysia

208.
See Tun Salleh Abas, Amendment of the Malaysian Constitution,
[1997] M.L.J. 2, at xxxiv.
209.
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 138 (quoting MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD, THE
MALAY DILEMMA 11(1981)).

210.
Id. at 139. "[C]onstitutional amendment acts were passed in 1981,
1983, twice in 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1994." Id.
211. Helen Johnstone, Entering the Twilight Zone, ASIAN Bus., Feb. 1997, at
48, availablein LEXIS, Busfin Library, ABI File.
212.
Singapore's GDP in 1996 was $23,565; Hong Kong's was $23,892. Id.
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out of the competition for all but the highest level of value-added
manufacturing." 2 13 Some companies have already begun to move
their production to other Asian countries. 2 14 Malaysia's rapid
success will soon render it unable to compete with its South
Asian neighbors, unless the composition of its economy
dramatically changes.
Solving this problem has forced Malaysia to reconsider its
approach to the entertainment and information industries. In the
past, as recently as 1994, Malaysia attempted to protect its
citizens from the moral decline that would supposedly result from
cable television. In the process, Malaysia became "one of the
most strictly controlled TV markets in Asia."2 15
But with
overwhelming competition in the manufacturing sector, an
increased demand for television in markets all over Asia, and a
realization that "[i]nformation is wealth today,"21 6 Malaysia
appears ready to abandon its fears and plunge into the
2 17
Information Age.
Prime Minister Mahathir's ambitious Vision 2020 plan is
designed to catapult Malaysia from a developing nation into a

fully developed nation by the year 2020.218 To implement this
plan, the government has called for the creation of the Multimedia
Super Corridor (MSC), an ideal environment for businesses "to
create, distribute, and employ multimedia products and services

in Southeast Asia."2 19 The MSC will measure nine miles wide and
thirty miles long, 220 occupying approximately 290 square miles as

213. Tom McHale, Multimedia Drives Future,ELECTRONIc BUYERS' NEWS, Jan.
27, 1997, at 10, available in LEXIS, Market Library, PROMOT File.
214.
Id.
215.
Helen Johnstone, Airwaves Open for Business, ASIAN BuS., Jan. 1997,
at 33, availablein LEXIS, Busfin Library, ABI File (citing a study by Prof. Joseph
Chan of Hong Kong's Chinese University).
216. Astro Bodies, CABLE & SATELLITE ASIA, Jan. 1997, at 20, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CSASIA File (quoting Information Minister Datuk Mohamed
Rahmat).
217.
Liberalizing its censorship laws will be necessary for Malaysia to
achieve its economic goals. See John Tusa, InternationalSatellite Television-Good
Neighbour or Global Intruder?,7 EUR. Bus. J. 45 (1995), available in LEXIS, BUSFIN
Library, ABI File (observing "[tlhere is strong evidence that a country cannot
modernise and turn from a controlled economic system to an open one unless it
enjoys access to open information. The more educated a society, the less it can be
separated from news that does not insult its intelligence.").
218. Vision 2020 was introduced by Dr. Mahathir in a working paper titled
The Way Forward. See Prime Minister's Office, Vision 2020: The Way Fonvward-Vision
(visited Nov. 1,
1997) <http://wwv.smpke.jpm.my/jaring/ighlight/vision.html>
[hereinafter Vision 2020 (providing some thoughts by Dr. Mahatthir on the future course
of Malaysia). See infi Part IV (discussing Vision 2020).
219.
Stephanie Langenfeld, How Commerce Conquers Censorship in
SoutheastAsia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 1997, at 19.
220. McHale, supra note 213.
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it extends from Asia's tallest building, newly completed in
downtown Kuala Lumpur, to Asia's largest airport.2 2 1
The
government also plans to create a new paperless administrative
capital, Putrajaya, and an "intelligent" city named Cyberjaya, both
located within the MSC. 2 22 In addition, a multimedia university
and a technology park will be incorporated into the area. 223 This
gamble on the nation's economic future could cost as much as
22 4
$40 billion.
Because Malaysia lacks the workers, knowledge, and
companies necessary to fill the MSC on its own, the gamble can
only pay off if Hollywood and Silicon Valley are willing to move
their multimedia developments overseas. 2 25 Some believe that
Malaysia can only realistically expect that the innovation,
creativity, and knowledge held by leading-edge technology and
entertainment corporations will eventually have a "trickle down"
2 26
or "rub off" effect within Malaysia.
Thus, it is not surprising that the MSC's international
advisory panel is a veritable "Who's Who List" of high technology
business leaders from the United States and Japan.2 27 Several of
these executives have already agreed to locate aspects of their
companies within the MSC. 228 But despite the high number of
applications for the MSC 22 9 and initial enthusiasm for the project,
some wonder whether these locations will ever be used to create
multimedia applications, in part because of Malaysia's history of

221. Malaysia's Information Ambitions: Virtually Fantastic, ECONOMIST, Mar.
1, 1997, at 67.
222. "Cyberjaya" is Malay for "CyberCity." See McHale, supranote 213.

223.

Id.

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Jeff Greenwald,
Thinking Big, WIRED
(visited Aug.
1997)
<http://wwww.wired.com/wired/5.08/malaysia.htm1>.
227. Among the members are the heads of Microsoft, Sony, and IBM.
Multimedia Development Corporation, MSC International Advisory Board (visited
Nov. 1, 1997) <http://mdc.cinenet.net/msc/advisory/index.html> (listing the
membership of the panel).
228.
Sun Microsystems, for example, plans to create "competency centers"
for learning Java, its programming language for Intemet-based applications. A.
Shukor Rahman, Sun Microsystems to Focus on JCC, NEW STRAITS TIMES, June 19,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. Oracle has begun work on
several applications for the MSC. Toh Han Shih, Oracle to help Malaysia's MSC
with 3 FlagshipProjects,Bus. TIMES (Sing.), July 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, BUSTMS File.
229. By October 1997, the corporation managing the MSC had received 150
applications from companies seeking MSC status. Francis C. Nantha, Two Firms
Show Faith in MSC Project by Moving OHQ, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. Of these applications, 35.3% were
submitted by local companies and another 26.6% were joint ventures with foreign
corporations. Id.
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media censorship. 2 30
Malaysia's Multimedia Development
Corporation, responsible for enticing businesses to come to the
MSC, can offer deferred taxes and an impressive technological
infrastructure, but it will be difficult to convince the Internet and
multimedia communities to relocate to a country that continues
231
to devalue freedom of expression.
B. PoliticalPressures

The government's traditional approach to the information and
entertainment industries belies a fundamental skepticism of
democracy.
The government has traditionally implied that
political and information rights would damage the economy,
although empirical studies have never found a connection
between authoritarian impulses and economic growth. 23 2 In
reality, the government's authoritarian impulses seem most
closely related to the Barisan Nasional's desire to remain in
power. History has taught political leaders that an expanding
economy is a good way to maintain power. 23 3 Therefore, it is not
surprising that human rights issues and democratic aspirations
have taken a back seat to political self-preservation, accomplished
through occasional authoritarian actions.
Democratic pressure within Malaysia is increasing; however,
23 4
steady economic growth has created an educated middle class.

230. Greenwald, supranote 226. One business leader has suggested that
"the MSC will work only i there is a wall built around it' [to keep out Mahathir's
authoritarian leadership]." Id
231. Id.
232. Daniel A. Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflections
on an East-West Dialogue, 18 HUMAN RTs. Q. 641, 645 (1996).
According to Harvard University economist and philosopher Amartya Sen,
however, there is little evidence to vindicate the "general theory" that
political and civil rights hamper economic growth. Systematic crossnational statistical studies do not support the claim that there is a
correlation or causal connection between authoritarianism and economic
success. In fact, civil and political rights may help to safeguard economic
security in the sense that such rights draw attention to major social
disasters and induce an appropriate political response.
Id.
233. Despite a victory by the Barisan Nasional, Malaysia's recession in the
mid-1980s led to a party split in UMNO and to a consolidated opposition.
CROUCH, supranote 16, at 246-47.
234. Michael Shari et al., Damage Contro: Can Mahathir Get Back on
Course?, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 48. See also Kieran Cooke, Survey of
Malaysia, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, FINTME
File (quoting Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim's comments that the membership of
UMNO has changed from "fishermen, farmers and teachers" to "corporate leaders,
entrepreneurs and professionals").
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Gradually, this group has learned the importance of democratic
rule in attaining long-term stability and economic growth. After
Dr. Mahathir's attempts to resolve the nation's currency crisis
single-handedly, some have begun to suggest that the Prime
Minister resign. 235 Such sentiment is remarkable, considering
the intense popularity and control Dr. Mahathir has held during
his seventeen years as prime minister.
Increased attention to the democratic process by citizens and
minority political parties may also lead to problems within the
ruling alliance. 23 6 Eventually, infighting23 7 and corruption 238 may
also lead to a loss in confidence among concerned voters and
politicians within UMNO, allowing more democratic members of

the party to lead. One such leader is Finance Minister Anwar
Ibrahim, heir-apparent to the nation's highest political office. 2 3 9
Mr. Anwar is more than twenty years younger than Dr. Mahathir,
and his public statements suggest a relaxed and democratic
approach to the nation's censorship regime. 24 0

235. Shari et al., supranote 234, at 49.
236. See Cooke, supra note 234 (noting that "[w]hile no one in his
administration dares at present to question the prime minister's authority, there
is political ferment within his [UMNO] party").
237. Because UMNO has often awarded lucrative contracts for public
projects to political supporters as a method of consolidating its power, factions
within the party are motivated not only by political power, but also by the
potential for wealth. Id.
238.
See Quest Economics Database, Malaysia: July 1997, HILFE COUNTRY
REP., July 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, QUESTD File (Perhaps the
main threat to UMNO's control of the political scene is the possibility of some
negative fall-out through association with corruption charges and other illegal
practices.").
UMNO has been increasingly beset by political scandals. An
important party leader in the state of Malacca resigned after allegations that he
had sex with an underage girl. Cooke, supra note 234. See also Cracking Down
on Corruption, BUS. TIMES (Malay.), June 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MBUSTM File (discussing several other incidents of corruption involving
high-ranking UMNO officials).
Nonetheless, UMNO remains completely in control of the nation's politics,
controlling Parliament and the local governments in every state except Kelantan,
and possibly Sabah.
Quest Economics Database, supra (the PAS controls
Kelantan). After some success in the 1990 elections, opposition parties were

disorganized during the 1995 elections and lost many of their seats in the state
assemblies and Parliament. Id. Recognizing this threat, Dr. Mahathir stressed
the importance of curbing political corruption during his party's conference in
October 1996. Id. In addition, anti-corruption laws have been strengthened.
Brendan Pereira, Gov't vs. Graft: Wo's Ahead?, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 17,
1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, STRAIT File.
239.
See Quest Economics Database, supranote 238 (stating that Anwar is
widely expected to replace Mahathir as prime minister in 1999).
240.
Shari et al., supranote 234.
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C. Human Rights Issues
Western conceptions of human rights have been consistently
criticized by Dr. Mahathir, much to the delight of leaders in other
developing nations. 24 1 His beliefs about human rights have, in
turn, been condemned by foreign commentators and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).242 Malaysia's heavy-handed
responses to protestors in East Timor, 24 the struggles of the
orang asli, 244 and Vietnamese immigrants 2 4 5 have drawn critical
attention from the international media and human rights
activists. As Malaysia seeks to market itself as a "foreignerfriendly"2 46 center for developing multimedia and entertainment
products, its human rights practices will come under closer
scrutiny. Thus, even though Malaysia disputes the existence of
internationally-recognized human rights, the country may alter
its censorship practices to prevent further "public relations"
fiascoes.
Malaysia's current system of media regulations raises human
rights concerns that implicate several international agreements.

See Kieran Cooke, How Malaysia Discardedits Fear of China: A New
241.
Alliance is Emerging to Counter Western Influence, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, FINTME File (noting the response of the Chinese
government). See also Kassim, supranote 207.
See, e.g., Malaysia-HumanRights: Reopen East-West Debate on Rights,
242.
Inter Press Serv., Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File
(noting the reactions of the U.S. and European Union to Dr. Mahathir's proposal
that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights be re-examined because it
does not reflect Asian views); Anil Noel Netto, Malaysia Activists Protest
Government Crackdown on NGOs, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 15, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File.
Syed Azman, Malaysia Deports 10 Timor Meeting Activists, Reuters N.
243.
Am. Wire, Nov. 11, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, REUNA File.
The orang asli are nomadic and semi-nomadic societies of indigenous
244.
Malays that inhabit the forests of Malaysia. See Robert M. Hardaway et al.,
Tropical Forest Conservation Legislation and Policy: A Global Perspective, 15
WHITTIER L. REv. 919, 937-38 (1994) (discussing the difficulties faced by the orang
asli in preserving their homelands); P. Prashanth, Malaysia: Aborigines Assert
Rights to Their Jungle, Inter Press Serv., Jan. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, INPRES File.
245. Although he subsequently changed his mind, on June 15, 1979, Dr.
Mahathir threatened to expel more than 70,000 Vietnamese refugees living in
Malaysian camps and to shoot any more attempting to land. Malaysia Threatens
Vietnamese, FAcTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEsT, June 22, 1979, availablein LEXIS,
News Library, FACTS File.
246. Prime Minister's Office, The 12th InternationalGeneral Meeting Of The
1997),
30,
Sept.
(visited
Council
Cooperation
Economic
Pacific
("The
<http://www.smpke.jpm.my/gn-data/ucapan.pm/ 1997/970930.htm>
industrialisation and rapid growth of Malaysia is due to foreign investments. We
are foreigner-friendly.").
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Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
provides for "information rights," identified as the "freedom of
opinion and expression," including the right to "seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
of frontiers."2 4 7 Malaysia's paternalistic approach to the media
industries runs counter to the letter and spirit of this agreement,
as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 248 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.2 4 9 Known as the International Bill of Rights
in combination with the UDHR, these documents elaborate on the
basic principles outlined in the UDHR.
Although the International Bill of Rights has long achieved
widespread assent, Malaysia's resistance is typical of lesser
developed nations2 5 0 that do not agree with the principles
outlined therein. 25 1
The UN's approach has been criticized
because it canonizes the "free flow of information" principle

247.

G.A. Res. 217 (II)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (art. 19), at 71, 74-75 (1948),

reprinted in

2

DusAN J.

DJONVICH,

UNITED NATIONS

RESOLUTIONS,

SERIES I:

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 135, 138-39 (1973).
248.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
249.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
250.
Developing nations are not alone in opposing a completely unrestricted
approach to the media. Some fully developed nations oppose this principle,
although generally for reasons of cultural preservation, not paternalistic morality
or economic development.
See Lucien J. Dhooge, No Place for Melrose:
Channelsurfing, Human Rights, and the European Union's aTelevision Without
Frontiers"Directive,16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT' & COMP. L. 279, 316-33 (1996).
251.
Two oft-given arguments against Western-style human rights are: (1)
the claimed right to limit human rights to correct social and political crises, and
(2) the belief that cultural and moral differences yield different conceptions of
human rights. See Bell, supranote 232, at 643-44. Islamic nations also approach
human rights issues from a different perspective. See generally Ann Elizabeth
Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Culturesor a Clash with
a Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994).
The UDHR also suffers as a tool for enforcing human rights because it was
created without the opinions of East Asian nations. See Bell, supra note 232, at
655-56.
Although the UDHR is normatively binding, most East Asian states
endorsed it for pragmatic, political reasons and not because of deeply held
commitment to the human rights norms it contains. The UDHR thus does
not have the normative force and political relevance of a constitution that
emerges from genuine dialogue between interested parties keen on finding
a long term solution to a shared political dilemma. It is possible, however,
that if the International Bill of Human Rights . . . has a proper
enforcement mechanism-such as an international UN force with the
explicit mission to intervene in cases of gross human rights violations-it
could gain greater legitimacy among states.
Id. at 655.
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resulting from U.S. inspirations. 25 2 Rather than encouraging an
uninhibited press and communications industry espoused by the
United States, many countries attempt to foster responsible
media production through state control.25 3 In Malaysia, the
government exhorts the media industries to provide accurate
reporting 25 4 and responsible entertainment. These exhortations
are backed with punishments to guarantee that these industries
understand their role in the economic development of
25 5
Malaysia.
Appeals to national economic development or social stability
as justifications for limiting information rights are common in
developing countries. Yet, such appeals are wearing thin in
Malaysia, where the rate of economic growth has hovered at an
amazing eight percent for the last five years, and the last
significant racial violence occurred more than a quarter century
ago. 25 6 A more recent justification for Malaysia's human rights
violations of political and religious minorities has been the
proposition that the "right of the majority for a comfortable life"
supersedes the countervailing human rights. 25 7 Nevertheless,
while democratic nations have occasionally been forced to
suspend the rights of citizens during periods of crisis, 25 8 no crisis

252. Jonathan Graubart, What's News: A Progressive Framework for
Evaluating the International Debate Over the News, 77 CAL. L. REV. 629, 631-32
(1989).
253. Id. at 632. Although this concept may have originated with the United

States, it has been widely accepted.

See Thomas R. Wolfe, Note, A New

International Information Order: The Developing World and the Free Flow of
Information Controversy, 8 SYRAcUSE J. INTL L. & COM. 249, 251-52 (1980) (stating
that the ideal of freedom of information has achieved the status of customary
international law).
254.
Minister: We do Enjoy Press Freedom, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Apr. 28,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File (quoting a government
minister's statement that news reporting should be responsible, accurate, and
truthful).
255.
See JournalistsTold to be Responsible, NEW STRAITS TIMES, June 12,
1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. The Chief Minister
suggested that "as the government is stepping up its effort to develop the
economy, the media could assist by reporting more on the development and less
on politics." Id.
256.
See Bell, supra note 232, at 649-50 (commenting that "[o]nce the
economic or political troubles are more or less successfully overcome, then
according to the government's own logic the denial of rights is no longer
justified").
257. Ashraf Abdullah, Practice What You Preach, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar.
11, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File.
258.
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
recognizes the right of nations to undertake emergency measures.
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
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currently exists in Malaysia. The desire to perpetuate a frenetic
pace of economic growth cannot justify the country's long-term
259
displacement of human rights.
Despite Malaysia's reliance on economic growth as a panacea,
remaining racial tensions cannot be forever repressed by a
popularly-elected government. 2 60
Successfully completing the
Vision 2020 plan will require Malaysia to confront the
international community's growing clamor over the nation's
widespread human rights violations.
D. Emerging Technologies:
An OuterBarrieron Government Censorship
The Internet poses special problems for Malaysia's regulatory
system. The prime minister has admitted that censoring this
medium is virtually impossible. 2 6 1 New technological advances
may eliminate the government's ability to regulate other
entertainment and information sources.
Technological
improvements are already decreasing the distinction between
radio, 2 6 2 television, movies, and "traditional" Internet features
such as electronic mail and the World Wide Web. 2 63

Live

Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their
other obligations under international law....
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supranote 248, at 174.
259. Bell, supranote 232, at 649-50.
260.
Nonetheless, Malaysia appears to be targeting economic growth as a
solution to remaining racial tensions. See Growth Necessaryfor Stability, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 30, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 13265767 (reporting Deputy
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's comments that the nation's economy must grow
more than 4% annually to avoid a repeat of the 1969 race riots).
261.
Lee Lam Thye, Solution Not in Censoring the Internet, NEW STRAITS
TMEs, Jan. 8, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. In addition to
the quantity of information available on the Internet, the ability to mirror web
sites further increases the challenge of regulating the nternet. See John T.
Delacourt, The InternationalImpact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207,
214 (1997) (describing one use of mirror sites to thwart censors in Germany);
Kelly Kunsch, Diogenes Wanders the Superhighway: A Proposalfor Authentication
of Publicly DisseminatedDocuments on the Internet,20 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 749, 76970 (1997) (discussing the use of mirror sites to improve the flow of information on
the Internet).
262. Many radio stations, including Malaysian stations, broadcast
simultaneously on the Internet. See, e.g., RTM, Radio Live (visited Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://www.asiaconnect com.my/rtm-net/live/index.html>
(listing
six
Malaysian radio stations available on the Internet).
263.
Harold M. White, Jr. & Rita Lauria, The Impact of New Communication
Technologies on International Telecommunication Law and Policy: Cyberspace and
the Restructuringof the InternationalTelecommunication Union, 32 CAL. W. L. REV.
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television 26 4 and interactive videos 265 delivered via the Internet
may soon be widely available and completely uncensored. 26 6 This
possibility threatens to render large portions of Malaysia's
regulatory system obsolete. Already, technological advances have
had the effect of overwhelming Malaysia's censors. 2 67 The vast
amount of information available in cyberspace and its ease of
access only compound the problem.
IV. "I CAN SEE CLEARLY Now": VISION 2020, MALAYSIA'S RESPONSE TO
THE PRESSURES OF ITS REGULATORY SYSTEM

Malaysia's dramatic decision to plunge into the Information
Age began with a paper presented by Prime Minister Mahathir in
early 1991.268 Titled "Malaysia: The Way Forward," this paper set
an agenda for the nation to become fully developed by 2020.269
This agenda, subsequently labeled Vision 2020, reflects farsighted goals of achieving developed-nation status, but it also
1, 1-3 (1995) (discussing the integration of communication industries and
technologies, and the effect on governments' regulations).
264. At least one television channel already broadcasts simultaneously on
the Internet. See Fox News Network, Fox News Channel (visited Oct 29, 1997)
<http://www.foxnews.com> (file is fac20.rm, viewable with Real Media software).
CNN maintains video clips of recent broadcasts on its website. See CNN, Today
(visited Oct. 29, 1997) <http://www.cnn.com/CNNPromos/cnn.html>;
on CNA,
CNN, CNNfn-OnAir (visited Oct. 29, 1997) <http://cnnfn.com/fnonair/> (viewable
with VXtreme software).
265. White & Lauria, supranote 263, at 2.
266. Malaysians with Internet access, a fast modem, and the right software
can already receive the Fox News Channel live on their computers. See Fox News
Network, supranote 264.
267. Dr. Mahathir has already admitted the censors are being overwhelmed
by the amount of material that should be censored. Malaysia's Mahathir Urges
Self-Censorship, Reuters World Serv., Oct. 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, REUWLD File. The government has expressed its concern over the use of
the Internet to communicate political messages. Norlin Wan Musa, Traitors
'Feeding Foreign Media,' STAR (Malay.), Oct. 9, 1997 (copy on file with Author)
(reporting the Information Minister's statements that some Malaysians have been
acting as "agents" for the foreign media, treacherously feeding them "malicious
information" over the Internet).
Of more concern to Malaysia, however, is the availability of pornography online, an issue that has drawn world-wide attention. See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Skin
Trade Spreading Across US; High Tech Fuels Boom for $10b Industry, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File. See also
Jason Kay, Note, Sexuality, Live Without a Net Regulating Obscenity and Indecency
on the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 355, 355-68 (1995) (exploring the
different types of pornography currently available on the Internet, as well as the
potential for "virtual sex" over the Internet).
268.
Farid Alatas, The Real Challenge Facing the New Malay, BUS. TIMES
(Sing.), Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, BUSTMS File.
See Vision 2020, supranote 218.
269.
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reflects the administrative and political difficulties the nation
presently encounters while attempting to censor a vast amount of
information.
Vision 2020 identifies nine challenges for Malaysia to
overcome.2 70 These challenges can be grouped within separate,
but closely related political, social, psychological, and economic
agendas.2 71 The political agenda identifies three challenges to
Malaysia's quest to join the ranks of the developed nations. The
first challenge is "establishing a united Malaysian nation with a
sense of common and shared destiny."27 2 The other challenges
are "fostering and developing a mature democratic society" and
2 73
establishing a "mature, liberal and tolerant society."
Socially, Vision 2020 seeks to overcome two challenges by
developing a "fully moral and ethical society, whose citizens are
strong in religious values and imbued with the highest of ethical

standards" and by "establishing a fully caring society and a caring
culture."27 4 The psychological agenda targets the creation of a
"psychologically liberated, secure and developed Malaysian society
27
with faith and confidence in itself." 5
The government's primary focus, however, seems to be the
economic agenda. It encompasses three challenges: establishing
a prosperous society with a "competitive, dynamic, robust and
resilient" economy, ensuring a just society with equitable wealth
distribution, and creating an innovative, scientific, and
2 76
progressive society.
The aspirations included in Vision 2020 identify the
conflicting pressures within Malaysia. The government desires
greater religious commitment, while simultaneously seeking
economic development and increased democratization. Yet, the
infusion of western values and influences that will result from the
MSC and liberalized broadcasting laws is viewed negatively.
Vision 2020 merely creates a destination; it does not suggest a
resolution to these value conflicts.
A. The Multimedia Super Corridor:Asia's Silicon Valley?
By far the most expensive and most strategic aspect of the
Vision 2020 plan is the MSC. Malaysia envisions the MSC as a
center for the development of seven "Flagship Applications,"

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id.
Id.

276.

Id.
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divided into categories for "Multimedia Development" and
"Multimedia Environment."2 77 Eventually, however, Vision 2020
will demand more from the MSC than a stream of investment
revenue. To overcome its "challenge" and become a center for
multimedia development and innovation, Malaysians must
acquire knowledge and a sense for innovation from the MSC's
foreign investors and eventually develop its own multimedia
products.
To attract multimedia and technology corporations to the
MSC, Prime Minister Mahathir has embarked on a series of
promotional campaigns in the United States, Europe, and Japan.
In his speeches, the prime minister has expressed Malaysia's
commitment to a "Bill of Guarantees," extended to any company
allowed to operate within the MSC. 2 78 In addition to guaranteeing
"a world-class physical and information infrastructure" and
"competitive financial incentives," the list of promises includes the
2 79
promise that Malaysia will ensure the Internet is not censored.
It is ironic, considering Malaysia's history of censorship, that
the country now guarantees an uncensored Internet within its
MSC. This guarantee evidences two concerns: skepticism of
potential multimedia investors and competition for investment

277. Multimedia Development Corporation, MSC Flagship Applications
(visited Nov. 1, 1997) <http://mdc.cinenet.net/flagship/index.html>.
The
Multimedia Development applications are "Electronic Government," "MultiPurpose Card," "Smart Schools," and "Telemedicine."
The Multimedia
Environment applications are "R&D Cluster," "World-Wide Manufacturing Webs,"

and "Borderless Marketing." Id.
278. Multimedia Development Corporation, MSC--cen9es-Bffl of Guantees
(visited Nov. 1, 1997) <http://mdc.dnenetnet/msc/incent/bil/indexhml> (reproducing
Malaysia's guarantees):
1.
2.

Provide a world-class physical and information infrastructure.
Allow unrestricted employment of local and foreign knowledge

workers.
3.
Ensure freedom of ownership by exempting companies with MSC
Status from local ownership requirements.
4.
Give the freedom to source capital globally for MSC infrastructure,
and the right to borrow funds globally.
5.
Provide competitive financial incentives.

6.

Become a regional leader in intellectual property protection and

cyberlaws.

7.
8.

Ensure no Internet censorship.
Provide globally competitive telecoms tariffs.

9.
Tender key MSC infrastructure contracts to leading companies
willing to use the MSC as their regional hub.

10.
Provide a high-powered implementation agency to act as an
effective one-stop super shop.
279. Chris Petrikin, Malaysian Technopolis Tries to Curry Biz Favor, DAILY
VARIETY, Jan. 16, 1997, at 12, availablein LEXIS, News Library, PAPERS File.
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from Singapore or other high-tech ventures in Southeast Asia,
such as the Subic Cybercity in the Philippines 28 0 and Taiwan's
Hsinchu Science Park.2 8 1 By making this promise, Malaysia
gains a marketing advantage over Singapore and other nations
that continue their attempts to censor the Internet. 28 2 Of course,
there are limits: the Internet remains subject to censorship
outside the MSC.28 3 In addition, the broad language employed in
the Printing Press Act and other statutes remains applicable to
the Internet and related technologies.2 8 4 Thus, MSC corporations
could be regulated for content distributed on the Internet
although it was created within the MSC. This may become a
more significant concern if the government's attitude toward
Internet censorship changes as the Internet becomes widely used
within Malaysia for everything from shopping to pornography to
2 85
political organization.
In addition to censorship concerns, the MSC faces two
significant obstacles. First, Malaysia's recent currency crisis may
threaten foreign investment, especially because the circumstances
surrounding the crisis suggest that a more open flow of
information within the country could have prevented the market
overvaluation that preceded the market crash. 28 6
Second,

280.
Subic Cybercity Risingfrom Old US Navy Base, METRO. COMPUTER TIMES,
May 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10172372.
281. Malaysia's InformationAmbitions: Virtually Fantastic,ECONOMIST, Mar.
1, 1997, at 67.
282. Neighboring Singapore has chosen to vigorously regulate pornography
and political discussion on the Internet. Peng Hwa Ang & Berlinda Nadarajan,
Censorship and the Internet: a Singaporeperspective, COMM. OF THE ACM, June
1996, at 72.
283. Malaysia has only committed to an uncensored Internet with
corporations that attain MSC status. See Multimedia Development Corporation,
supranote 278.
284.
The prime minister has stated that all existing regulations continue to
apply to the Internet. Calvin Goh & Zainul Ariffm, Dr. M: Malaysia Still Attractive
to Investors Despite Competition, NEW STRAiTS TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. As an example, the prime minister explained
that "should a user transmit or distribute pornographic or illegal materials from
the World Wide Web he could be charged for transgression." Id.
285.
See supranote 261 and accompanying text Currently, few Malaysians
use the Internet. One reporter has estimated that only one out of every thousand
Malaysians has Internet access. Joseph Edwin, Malaysia Moves Toward Less
Censorship, USA TODAY, May 3, 1996, at 7A. A different source estimates the
total number of Malaysian Internet users at 50,000. Singapore-Government
Clamps Down on Internet and Supports its FUture, TELENEWS ASIA, Mar. 21, 1996,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, NWLTRS File.
286.
See Rational Expectations, JAKARTA PosT, Aug. 6, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, JKPOST File (discussing the role of information in Asian
financial markets).
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28 7
Malaysia must overcome a shortage of "knowledge workers."
Although the Multimedia University and the government's

guarantee of unrestricted employment of knowledge workers from
overseas will help, potential MSC corporations may be adverse to
waiting for employees to be trained and to importing employees.
B. Asia's Hollywood?
A related aspect of the MSC and Vision 2020 is Malaysia's
288
goal to become a broadcasting and filmmaking center for Asia.
During a speech to entertainment industry leaders in Los Angeles,
Dr. Mahathir invited Hollywood to use the MSC as a means of
through
"multicultural content
diversifying its audience
creation."2 8 9 Entertainment "localised in its languages, myths,
characters, music, allusions and locations" would appeal to the
increasingly wealthy citizens of Asia's developing nations. 2 90 The
prime minister also suggested that the increasing use of
computer-generated images in movies and video games creates
the possibility
for Hollywood to forge partnerships with the
MSC. 2 91
Malaysia's broadcasting industry also has aspirations
The
independent of any partnership plans with Hollywood.
television programming has
demand for locally-produced
increased as a result of the legalization of satellite dishes and
To
simultaneous creation of a satellite television industry. 2 9
meet this demand and to become a broadcasting and filmmaking
center for Asia, the Information Ministry has investigated the
creation of a "film city."2 93 Currently, most Asian language films
are created in Hong Kong or India, but these film industries have

287.

Slightly Slower Rate of Employment Growth, Bus. TIMES (Malay.), Oct.

18, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, MBUSTM File (discussing the general

labor shortage in Malaysia, as well as the government's proposals to increase the
numbers of knowledge workers).
288. Proposalfor National Film Board to Oversee Local Film Industry, NEW
STRAITS TIMES, May 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File. The
Malaysia East Asia Satellite Corporation was "one of the first companies to set up
in the MSC." Johnstone, supranote 215.
289. Hollywood Invited to Use Malaysia's MSC to Localise in Asia, ASIA PULSE,
Jan. 15, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 10596915.

290.

Id.

291.
Karen Lowe, Mahathir Seeks Hollywood's Help to Convert Malaysia into
Media Hub, Agence Fr.-Presse, Jan. 15, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 2040346.
292.
Freddie Ng, Proposalfor Setting Up of 'Film City' Under Study, NEW
STRAITS TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File
(noting a government directive that by 2000, television stations must air 80%
local programming).
293.
Id.
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Malaysia

hopes

increased production of local content will generate markets
2 9S

throughout the region.
Nonetheless, Malaysia's aspirations of becoming an
entertainment center will be impeded by the uncertainty created
by the nation's censorship regulations. The prime minister's
ideas easily become overlapping restrictions and make compliance
difficult, while simultaneously increasing the penalties for noncompliance. 2 96 The regulatory scheme places enormous authority
in individual cabinet members to augment the censorship system
with individual decisions.
The Ministry of Information has
already used this power to block two CNN broadcasts, one
discussing the plight of the orang asli2 97 and another
documenting the return of the Pope from Paris. 2 98 A concert by
pop artist Michael Jackson was delayed almost a year until the
prime
minister overruled a regional minister's decision to ban
it.2 99
The cost to promoters when events or films are banned can
be severe. 3 °° The potential repercussions from a dissemination of
undesirable news or entertainment may be even more serious. In
1994, Malaysia briefly instituted a "Buy British Last" campaign
after an erroneous story in the Sunday Times suggested that a
British company was prepared to bribe Prime Minister Mahathir
to secure a construction contract.30 1
Malaysia's reaction
30 2
conjured up memories of a similar conflict in the early 1980s.
Television programs shown outside Malaysia may result in
retaliation if they are critical of the government. 30 3 With such

294.
Don Groves et al., Movie Malaise Grips Asia, VARIETY, July 21, 1997, at
5, availablein LEXIS, News Library, US File.
295.
See Ng, supranote 292.
296. Many provisions of the acts discussed in Parts II.B.2. and II.B.3. have
corresponding penal code provisions. For example, causing feelings of enmity on
the grounds of religion is punishable under § 298A of the Penal Code and under
pt. 2, § 4(1) of the Printing Press Act. See Printing Presses and Publications Act
1984, Schedule I1.
297.
See Hardaway et al., supranote 244, at 937-38; Prashanth, supranote
244.'
298.
See Pereira, supra note 159. The Pope's visit was censored out of
sensitivity to Muslim viewers. Id.
299.
Brendan Pereira, Moonwalk on a Tightrope, STRAITs TIMES, Nov. 5,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, STRAIT File.
300.
See EssentialIssues to Conquer in 1997, Naw STRAITs TIMES, Jan. 1,
1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File (complaining about the costs
imposed on promoters because of the absence of clear guidelines).
301.
Britain and Malaysia Widl Make Up - Minister,Reuters World Serv., Apr.
10, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
302.
Id.
303.
CROUCH, supra note 16, at 85 n.28 (discussing a report of a
government-encouraged "smear campaign" aimed at Australia).

1998]

CENSORSHIPIN MALAYSIA

possibilities, promoters, producers, and actors will hesitate to
expend the resources necessary to create entertainment products
that can compete with Hollywood products.
Unpublished regulations and inconsistent decisions present
further problems. Following the ban of the Malaysian movie
Amok, producers expressed their frustration over the lack of
predictable standards to guide their creative projects. 3 ° 4 The
Censorship Board instituted a ratings system in 1996, but
Malaysians remain unable to ascertain the Board's criteria for
deciding whether content matter warrants a U or an 18SX. 30 s
Viewers complain that popular sitcoms created in the United
States continue to receive an adult rating for sexual content after
censors have replaced all sexual innuendoes with long periods of
silence. 3 ° 6 At times, inattention to modem pop culture and slang
has also led to inaccurate censorship. 30 7 Some have suggested
that censorship decisions may occasionally be based on political
or anticompetitive pressure, rather than on the content of a
broadcast. 30 8 Furthermore, censorship decisions can be reversed
without persuasive explanation, instilling further uncertainty into
the regulatory system.30 9
Lacking clear guidance, most
fflmmakers and broadcasters seem to find it easier to produce

inexpensive predictable productions rather than risk financial
3 10
ruin on new, creative themes.

Finally, despite exultations of Malaysia as a "multi-cultural

content centre for digital entertainment,"3 1 ' the nation's stringent
censorship rules create considerable subject matter limitations.
Many of Malaysia's most dramatic and commercially interesting

304.
By Zieman, Ban on Amok Shocks Filmdom, NEW STPJUTS TIMES, Mar. 18,
1995, at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRTT File (noting industry
members' demands that the Censorship Board be made independent from the
Home Ministry and protests about the board's limitations on the local film
industry).
305.
SeeAl-Attas, supranote 118.
305.
Id.
307. Although references to sex would have been eliminated, the prime
minister's daughter noted that the phrase "humping around" had escaped the

censors' scissors. Michael Vatildotis, Music: Rapping in Malaysia, FAR E. ECON.
REv., July 22, 1993, at 32-33.
308.

See Chinese Judge, MalaysianJudgment, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1995, at

40 (discussing the Information Ministry's ban of a popular Taiwanese-made
television series ostensibly because the costume worn by the show's main
character, a judge, caused the show to violate a prohibition on "Chinese
costumed dramas).
309. Top Gun was shown on television in 1994, but was banned from
television in 1995 because of violence. Melanie Proctor, VHSC Ruling Leaves
Viewers in the Lurch, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 18, 1995, at 28, available in LEXIS,
News Library, NSTRTT File.
310. See Groves et al., supra note 294.
311. Prime Minister's Office, supra note 8, at para. 10.
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political and social events could never be the subject of a film or
television presentation.
The removal of Tun Salleh as Lord
President of the Supreme Court, the May riots, the Rulers' conflict
with the prime minister in 1993, and even Dr. Mahathir's
struggles against UMNO in his early career are examples of
stories that could become successful movie ventures in a less
repressive system.
Without increasing the predictability of its regulatory
approach, producers, actors, and promoters within Malaysia's
entertainment industry will continue to impose a measure of selfcensorship, restricting the quality and quantity of information
and ideas reaching the nation's population. In addition, laws
forbidding the discussion of "sensitive" political topics have had
the effect of preventing Malaysian audiences from experiencing
entire genres of film and television.
Unless these laws are
relaxed, many political and social stories or themes that could be
exploited commercially will remain undiscovered by Malaysian
audiences. And unless Malaysia's producers begin to create
attractive Malaysian
alternatives to
subtitled Hollywood
blockbusters, Malaysia's ambitions of becoming an entertainment
center will not succeed.

V. A CORRECTED VISION: PROPOSALS FOR ACHIEVING
MALAYSIA'S GOALS, WITHOUT CENSORSHIP
Defining predictable legal standards to govern the regulation
of multimedia products must become a priority for Malaysia. The
indeterminate potential for severe government censorship or an
outright ban will certainly discourage multimedia developers from
devoting substantial time and money to projects.3 12 Now that the
government is encouraging innovation and creativity, along with
its traditional cries for self-censorship and responsibility,
filmmakers, journalists, and other multimedia developers need
clear standards to illuminate the government's acceptable limits.
The best way to ensure consistency and predictability in
Malaysia's regulatory system would be to employ a method of
recorded adjudications in content regulation cases. The Film
Censorship Board and similar governmental agencies could
develop an adjudicatory system, recording its decisions. The

312. Consider the experience of the producers of the Malaysian movie
Amok, who were forced to choose between increasing the cost of the movie by
50% or abandoning their artistic efforts. See RM800,O00 Malay Movie Amok
Banned by Censors, supra note 115. The developers of multimedia products

should expect similar experiences with Malaysia's ambiguous regulatory scheme
as these products become similar to traditional entertainment products.
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result would be a coherent body of administrative law to inform
corporations, citizens, and legislators. Judicial review of agency
decisions would assure constitutionality and procedural justice.

An independent judiciary would prevent usurpation of power by
Parliament or the prime minister.
A. Restore the ConstitutionalMandate
of a True Separationof Powers
In a democracy, the judiciary's role is to serve as a check
against government intrusions on liberties held by the nation's
citizens or corporations. In close cases pitting the government's
economic or political goals against citizens' constitutional rights,
the judicial branch is systemically the most appropriate body to
resolve the conflict.3 1 3 The experiences of judicial branches in
several Southeast Asian democracies, including Malaysia,
however, suggest a fundamental misconception of the role of the
3 14
judiciary.
Contrary to the implicit beliefs of members of Malaysia's
Parliament and the prime minister, judicial review of
administrative or legislative actions restricting freedom of
expression will encourage growth within the targeted multimedia
and entertainment sectors. First, a body of case law defining the
limits of Parliament's authority to censor citizens' speech will
enable members of these strategic industries to gauge the
acceptability of projects before their completion. Eliminating this
legal ambiguity would have several positive effects.
It would
reduce the costs of content production by allowing producers to
rely on a culturally sensitive body of case law to avoid the massive
post-production editing frequently required by the board of
censors. 31 5
It would also reduce the risks of overregulation
stemming from majoritarian political or religious motivations.
The deterrent effect of possible government overregulation would
then equal the protection provided by a judicial remedy for

313. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and
Democratization:A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605,
606 (1996) (discussing the role of the judiciary in preserving the rule of law
during the process of documentation). "Ideally, through the application ofjudicial
or constitutional review, judges cannot only mediate conflicts between political

actors but also prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power. In fulfilling
this role, the courts become powerful actors in maintaining the submission of the
state to law." Id.
314. Hickling, supra note 167, at 26 (suggesting that one part of the
problem of the judiciary's role is the aversion to confrontation common to Asian
cultures).

315. See RM800,OOO Malay Movie Amok Banned by Censors, supranote 115
(discussing the edits required of two major Malaysian movies).
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As a result, media producers,

newspapers, and multimedia developers will be less likely to
engage in self-censorship as a means of self-protection.
A second result of judicial review would be to deter
Parliament and the prime minister from using the media and
media regulations as a means to accomplish political ends.
Because judicial decisions are not self-enforcing, however, this

result necessitates the recognition and cooperation of the
separate branches of Malaysia's government.
Regrettably,
hostility to the judicial process, exemplified by the many statutory
provisions designed to limit or proscribe judicial review, indicates
that an era of cooperation among governmental branches remains
distant.
Malaysia's judicial branch has not quietly acquiesced in its
displacement from the constitutional scheme. In some cases,
judges lacking a constitutional legal basis for action have invoked
principles of natural justice to review government activity. 3 16
These cases exemplify a courageous judiciary's desire to maintain
its authority and to limit an overzealous Parliament. Nonetheless,
a higher level of institutional respect must be afforded the
judiciary to prevent further separation of powers violations.
Recent events involving the judiciary indicate that the government
is willing to move in this direction. 3 17
If not, the ultimate
recourse of the judiciary will be to hope that the public will hold
"the Legislature-Executive politically accountable for their
3 18
attacks."
B. EliminatePolitical Control of the Mass Media
In addition to restoring judicial review, the government could
increase predictability within its legal system by relinquishing
control over many aspects of the nation's information and
entertainment industries.
Again, a more predictable legal
environment would result in less self-censorship and increased
innovative efforts.

316. See, e.g., J. P. Berthelsen v. Director-General of Immigration, Malaysia
& Ors, [1987] 1 M.L.J. 134 (1987) and text accompanying note 172; see generally
Nijar, supra note 32 (discussing a "right to be heard" as requirement of

procedural due process and natural justice, despite the language of the ISA).
317. In July 1996, the Attorney General refused to prosecute a High Court

judge who resigned after writing a pamphlet containing "112 allegations of

corruption, abuse of power, misconduct and immorality... which were directed
at 12 judges,' Ashraf Abdullah & Carolyn Hong, Poison-Pen Letter: Judge was
Responsible, NEW STRAITS TIMES, July 10, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NSTRTT File; however, the Attorney General indicated that the judge's
resignation accomplished the probable and desirable result of a prosecution. Id.

318.

Seu, supra note 166, at 88.
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1. Develop an Industry-Designed Ratings System
The

current

television

and

movie

ratings

system,

administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Censorship
Board, and the Ministry of Information, has created a host of
problems,3 19 including difficulties in
determining which
government body has jurisdiction. 320
To resolve some of the
problems created by the number of agencies involved, the
Information Ministry has proposed the establishment of a
National Film Board (NFB) to centralize and streamline the work
of these agencies. 3 2 1 Devoted to developing the nation's local film
industry, the NFB could assist film producers by reducing
bureaucratic delays and conflicting policy interpretations.
Although centralizing government control of the film industry
will eliminate some problems, the lack of predictability in the
application of ratings and censorship standards will remain.
Recorded decisions by agencies charged with applying the
censorship standards would reduce this uncertainty.
The
government's interests, however, would be best served by a
ratings system voluntarily administered by the film industry.
Such a system would foster creativity by reducing the uncertainty
currently faced by media producers. 3 22
A voluntary ratings
system would also reduce the government's role, confining it to
prosecutions for violations of an agency's guidelines. In addition,
a voluntary ratings system would eliminate the inconsistent
32 3
applications of restrictions resulting from the use of slang.
A properly used ratings system would also help Malaysia
develop different segments within its media markets by implicitly
encouraging producers to create movies and television programs
with specific ratings in mind. Although Malaysia's media markets
are small by Western standards, a successful use of an industry
ratings system might lead to an extension into other ASEAN
countries, thereby expanding the region's media markets and
32 4
creating a greater role for Malaysian broadcasting.

319.
320.

See supra Part 1V.B.
Proposalfor National Fim Board to Oversee Local Film Industry, supra

note 288.
321. Id.
322. See Hor & Seah, supranote 37, at 329 (arguing "censorship" should be
retained, but as a voluntary classification system which would guide the public
and provide certainty to media producers).
323. For an example of the censors' lack of slang comprehension, see
Vatikiotis, supranote 307, at 33.
324. ASEAN members have already agreed to form a regional broadcasting
confederation. Asean BroadcastersConfederation to be Formed, ASIA PULSE, Feb.
27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, APULSE File.
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The voluntary ratings system employed by the film industry

in the United States could provide a useful model for a Malaysian
film industry ratings system. During the 1960s, the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) responded to conflicting
decisions by local censor boards by creating a "production
code."3 25 In 1968, this code was abandoned in favor of a
voluntary ratings system, designed to provide parents with
information about the film concerning its suitability for viewing by
children.3 2 6 Ratings are based on age suitability and often
accompanied by explanations. 32 7 Because this ratings system
focuses on informing parents,32 8 the ratings are assigned by a
9
board composed of persons with "parenting experience." 32
Unlike Malaysia's government-imposed regulatory system,
the MPAA ratings do not constitute or require censorship. 3 30 In
the United States, only productions that exceed First Amendment
protection may be censored by the government. 33 1 Therefore,
because of the MPAA ratings system, the U.S., state, and local
governments have virtually no regulatory involvement in the vast
majority of films released every year. By displacing government
censor boards, the MPAA has fostered "creativity in the movie
industry, while assuring that parents are receiving information to
guide them in supervising what their children see at the theaters
or on videos." 3 32 Malaysian implementation of a similar system
for rating entertainment products would likely have similar effects
by centralizing the ratings process, eliminating the censorship

325. Richard M. Mosk, The Jurisprudence of Ratings Symposium Part I:
Motion PictureRatings in the United States, 15 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 135-

36 (1997).

Compliance with the code was required before a film could be

exhibited in theaters, but compliance created the assurance that the film would
not be censored. Id
326. Id. at 136-37.

327.

Id. at 138.

Additional information about the Motion Picture

Association of America is available at <http://www.mpaa.org>.
328. The MPAA and its ratings board "does not purport to determine what is
or is not appropriate for children. Rather, [the board] seeks to determine how
parents would consider the picture and what they would want to know about the
picture." Mosk, supranote 325, at 139.
329. Id. at 138.
330. Although an NC-17 board rating impedes a film's exhibition, this is the
result of the choices of advertisers and theaters. Id. at 141.
331. Id. at 141-42.
332. Id. at 144. A similar ratings system is now in use for television. Diane
Holloway, New ProgramRating System Begins Today, AuSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Oct.
1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, AUSTIN File. A ratings system has also
been proposed for video games. Matthew Hamilton, GraphicViolence in Computer
and Video Games: Is Legislation the Answer?, 100 DICK. L. REv. 181, 181-82
(1995) (discussing a proposed "Video Game Rating Act" which would have
established a commission responsible for rating video games).
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concerns of many producers, and providing valuable information
to parents.
2. End Political Control of the Mass Media

Although Malaysia began privatizing ownership

of its

television and radio broadcasts in 1985,333 most mass media
Until
producers continue to be controlled by political actors.3
1993, UMNO overtly controlled the New Straits Times, and it is
now run by four executives with strong ties to the deputy prime
minister. 33 5 The Star newspaper has traditionally been controlled
by the MCA.33 6 The termination of the television monopoly gave
rise to TV3, 3 3 7 a new station owned by companies closely affiliated
Radio remains subject to a government
with UMNO. 3 8
The bias of these news sources is often
monopoly.3 9
For example, during political campaigns, UMNO
apparent. 3 4°
candidates are described in glowing terms, while statements of
opposing party's candidates are misquoted or taken out of

context.

341

By ridding the media industry of these political controls,
Malaysia could create a more objective, competitive, and open
media industry. With newspapers competing to report the truth,
even from differing perspectives, Malaysians would be more
equipped to weigh their candidate's political positions during
They might also be informed about government
elections.
scandals that might otherwise be kept from the public. The right
to information cannot be meaningful if the information granted is
distorted or inaccurate.

333.
334.

See generaUyCROUCH, supranote 16, at 88; Hashim, supranote 12.
"The most conspicuous aspect of state control of the mass media has

been through ownership of majority shares. A monopoly of the media has been
accomplished through the business involvements of the main Barisan component
parties." ANNE MUNRO-KUA, AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM IN MALAYSIA 124 (1996).

335.
336.
337.
Televisyen
338.
339.
340.
341.

CROUCH, supra note 16, at 86.

Id.
Popularly named TV3, the full name of the television station is Sistem
(M) Berhad. Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
See MUNRO-KUA, supranote 334, at 125.
CROUCH, supranote 16, at 88.
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3. End Government Control Over Foreign News
The Malaysian government continues to control the nation's
only authorized news service, Bernama. 3 42 All foreign news must
flow through this news agency before dissemination into
Malaysia.3
When the government officially gave Bernama
monopoly rights in 1990, the amendment allowed the news
agency to "cease
being guided by U.N. declarations on freedom of
3
information." "
In June 1997, citing the government's commitment to "a free
flow of information" consistent with the MSC, the Information
Minister proposed a bill to eliminate Bernama's monopoly.3 45
Although the bill has since been tabled, it is likely to be enacted,
pending successful privatization of the news agency. 3 4 ' Bernama
could continue to be "an information distributing agency" and
might become a potential "content provider" within the MSC.3 4 7
Despite the government's discussion about eliminating
Bernama's monopoly on foreign news, the broadcast media has
already begun to supplant Bernama's position.'
Therefore,
eliminating this "monopoly" will have little practical effect, except
in increasing the credibility of the news agency and bolstering the
49
government's commitment to democracy3
C. EliminateInternet Censorship throughoutMalaysia

Malaysia has already agreed to eliminate censorship within
the MSC. This commitment reflects both an acknowledgment of
the impossibility of censoring the medium and an ironic

342. "In June 1990, Parliament enacted legislation malting the Malaysian
News Agency (Bernama) the sole distributor of foreign news in Malaysia,
formalizing previous practice." Malaysia: Human Rights Practices, 1992, supra
note 98.

343. Malaysian News Agency to Lose Rights Over Foreign News, ASIA PULSE,
June 12, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 10657514.

344.

Lai Kwok Kin, MalaysiaPasses ControversialBill on News Distribution,

REUTER LIBR. REP., June 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD
File.
345.
See Malaysian News Agency to Lose Rights Over Foreign News, supra

note 343.
346.
Move to Amend Bernama Act Withdraing Sole Foreign News Rights,
NEw STRAITS TIMES, Oct. 10, 1997, at 8, available in LEXIS, News Library, NSTRT
File.
347.
Id.

348.

Id. (reporting comments by Bernama's former editor-in-chief that the

news agency cannot compete with Astro and TV3).
349.
See Kin, supra note 344 (quoting opposition leaders who opposed the
1990 amendment on these grounds).
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marketing strategy; however, Malaysia has not extended this

guarantee to the entire nation.

Given the minimal numbers of Internet users, 3 s ° the
government clearly has little to gain by censoring the Internet in
the nation's nether regions. A commitment to the "free flow of
information" now may even facilitate a more rapid expansion of
the MSC to other parts of the nation. At the very least, it would
be consistent with its marketing scheme for the MSC.

VI. CONCLUSION

Kuala Lumpur is home to the world's tallest buildings, the
highest flagpole on earth, and a communication tower taller than
any in Southeast Asia. 3 51 Malaysia has succeeded in creating its
own national automobile and in attracting manufacturing
352
business.
But the MSC is unlike any other project Malaysia has
attempted. Infusing an innovative and creative spirit into a
population accustomed to censorship and reliance on trading
abilities will prove much more difficult than building cars and
skyscrapers. Despite the recent changes in its broadcasting laws
and the prime minister's guarantees, much of Malaysia's regime
of censorship remains intact. Malaysia is preparing to enter the
twenty-first century, but reluctantly.
The success of Hollywood and Silicon Valley have become
Yet,
models for Malaysia's Vision 2020 development plan.
Malaysia must not ignore the legal environment enabling these
Unless Malaysia eliminates the
communities to succeed.
uncertainty in its censorship regulations and restores judicial
independence to counter government over regulation, the country

risks stifling the innovation and creativity it needs to become a
fully developed nation.
Aaron D. Davidson*
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